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Intelligence has grown and changed dramatically over the past hundred years with the advent of 
cyberspace. This thesis will begin by examining how the intelligence cycle has adapted to 
accommodate cyber threats and opportunities, before conducting three national case studies 
examining the organisational changes in the signals intelligence agencies in New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States of America. It will utilise the analysis of how the intelligence cycle 
and States have grown to accommodate cyber phenomenon and will conduct two case studies on the 
recent events concerning Huawei and the hacking of the 2016 US Election. Through this, this thesis 
will ultimately show that one of the main responses to cyber by intelligence agencies has been 
increased social engagement, through interaction with the general public in a familiar cyber 
environment, such as Twitter, in an endeavour to combat the rise in cyber crime by promoting 
awareness of cyber security issues and ensuring people have the knowledge and means to keep 
themselves safe in cyber space. This has also involved the monitoring and combatting of extremist 
propaganda material disseminated online for the purposes of promoting extremist ideologies and 




I would like to thank my supervisor Dr Joe Burton, whose expert guidance and advice has been 
essential for writing this thesis, something for which I am immensely grateful. 
 





• This thesis is ready for examination 
• The thesis embodies the student’s own work, carried out under my direct supervision 
• Ethical approval is not required 
 
 






Title Page   …………………………………………………………………………………………...   1 
 
Abstract   ……………………………………………………………………………………………..   2 
 
Acknowledgements and Declaration   ……….………………………………………………………   3 
 
Contents   …………………………………………………………………………………………….   4 
 
Introduction   …………………………………………………………………………………………   5 
 
Introducing the Intelligence Cycle as a Conceptual Tool   …………………………………………..   6 
 Direction    
 Collection    
 Collation    
 Interpretation    
 Dissemination    
 
New Zealand Cyber and Intelligence   ……………………………………………………………...   14 
 Kitteridge Report    
 Intelligence and Security in a Free Society    
 Intelligence and Security Act 2017    
 Case Study – New Zealand Security Intelligence Service    
 New Zealand Intelligence Community    
 Government Communications Security Bureau 
 New Zealand’s Cyber Security Strategy 
 
Innovation and Adaptation to Cyberspace in British Intelligence   ………………………………...   22 
 Government Code and Cypher School 
 Government Communications Headquarters 
 National Cyber Security Strategy 
 National Cyber Security Centre 
 
United States of America   ………………………………………………………………………….   29 
 National Security Agency 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 1978 
 9/11 and the ‘War on Terror’ 
 Offensive Capabilities 
 
Issues Posed to Intelligence by Cyber   ……………………………………………………………..   35 
 Tallinn Manual 
 Right to Privacy 
 Cryptography 
 
The Huawei Scandal   ………………………………………………………………………………   41 
 
How the US Election Hack Shows the Threat to the State   …….………………………………….   43 
 
Analysis   ……………………………………………………………………………………………   45 
 
Conclusion   ………………………………………………………………………………………...   48 
 





Within the emerging field of cyber there has been a significant restructure of national intelligence 
communities globally. Alongside their foreign counterparts in more well-known agencies such as the 
British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) signals intelligence was initially tasked 
with accessing foreign communications. With the advance and rise of the internet and digital 
communications, the role of signals directorates has greatly transformed to adapt to this new 
phenomenon. Over recent years some of the more pressing implications of this have emerged, 
whereby this has significant implications for the task of counter-terrorism, where individuals who are 
possibly at risk of radicalisation can be identified and monitored. 
 
In exploring the question of how intelligence agencies are adapting to cyberspace, this thesis will 
show that one of the biggest changes within intelligence has been with the pursuit of social 
engagement to combat the diverse and dynamic threat that is posed by malicious cyber actors. Social 
engagement can be seen as the process where Agencies will participate in connecting with the wider 
public via a digital platform, such as Twitter. Such engagement here is an important tool as it allows 
the Agencies to effectively provide information about cyber security and helps to provide an 
appearance of transparency in the organisation. 
 
Using the Intelligence Cycle as a conceptual tool, the first section will discuss what this is and how it 
has evolved and developed over the years to incorporate cyber. The evolution of this has been 
necessary for intelligence agencies to keep pace with developments in communication and helping to 
provide them with a platform to protect the State from the cyber threat in the 21st Century. 
 
Using the recent changes in the intelligence agencies in New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States of America as national case studies, the next sections will show how they are 
respectively adapting to cyber. These three States were chosen as, while they are all Western 
democracies and are part of the intelligence sharing alliance known as Five Eyes, they have all had 
markedly different responses to cyber security but have arrived at somewhat similar outcomes. 
Ultimately I show that the major changes, which in most cases were a common theme among the 
three nations, were legislation reform allowing agencies to keep up pace with advances in cyber; 
embracing new forms of social media and engagement with the general public as a means of 
promoting cyber security and protecting the economic interests of the State; significant investment in 
specialised cyber divisions focused on major cyber security threats; and the development of offensive 
cyber capabilities to provide both a deterrence to targeted foreign cyber hostilities and as a means of 
pursuing targets to mitigate their operational effectiveness. 
 
Next will be an examination of some of the main issues that have been posed by cyber and the 
response by intelligence agencies. This will begin with a discussion of the Tallinn Manual and the 
importance of this endeavour to engage international law on the topic of cyber. Two of the main 
issues posed by cyber are the encroachment on the right to privacy, and the attempts at undermining 
public development of military-grade encryption technologies.  
 
Lastly it will discuss two case studies on cyber and how intelligence agencies have been able to 
respond here: the Huawei scandal and the US election hack. Both events are important in representing 
two very different politically charged situations, with the Huawei scandal accusations of the company 
being used by Chinese intelligence for international espionage, and the election hack involving state-
sponsored Russian hackers influencing the outcome of the 2016 US election campaign. These two 
case studies are also interesting in that they use the US national case study to address the topic of how 





1. Introducing the Intelligence Cycle as a Conceptual Tool 
 
The Cambridge University Press Dictionary defines intelligence as “the ability to learn, understand, 
and make judgements or have opinions that are based on reason1”. Within such a definition, 
intelligence requires understanding of the subject matter, how any new information relates to it, and 
using that information to generate a belief about something. The process that is used here for this is 
known as the Intelligence Cycle. The Intelligence Cycle has five main areas: Direction, Collection, 
Collation, Interpretation, and Dissemination.  
 
Modern intelligence underwent a dramatic transformation during the Second World War, where 
advances in technology and the increased need for quick, reliable, and secure communications 
prompted a variety of changes, and created several new Agencies, many of which were the precursor 
to the present-day communications intelligence agencies.  
 
Such necessary advances here included the increased adoption of cryptographic cyphers for securing 
diplomatic and military communiques, and the need for faster means of communication – not 
knowing what the enemy was doing, or what the State wanted you to do out of real-time was a deeply 
pressing issue. Communication technology had the power to sway victory into the hands of those who 
could transmit and receive information with little delay. 
 
Furthermore, another significant evolution in intelligence was precipitated by the devastating attacks 
against the United States of America on September 11, 2001, by the terrorist network Al Qaeda. This 
event was significant in that it marked a changing point in the level of threat posed to a Western state 
by a non-state actor – something quite critical in the post-Cold War era.  
 
While non-state and state-sponsored actors had posed significant threat to the State before, this was 
typically thought of as an issue belonging more to ‘non-Western’ states, such as Afghanistan. The 
events of September 11 showed an increase in the reach of non-state actors, bursting the imagined 
‘bubble’ of security. Since this event there had been several other highly publicised attacks, including 
the bombings in Bali in 2002 and London in 2005. Such incidents resulted in a transformation of the 
intelligence community and state security agencies around the world with the then-U.S. President 
George W. Bush signing the Homeland Security Act 2002 and Congress passing the USA PATRIOT 
Act. Furthermore, Australia passed the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2) 2005 once-again outlawing 
sedition2, and Canada adopted anti-terrorism laws for the first time3. 
 
Regarding this, Anton states that “The rapid evolution of all forms of risks and threats has led to a 
complete analysis of the entire spectrum of national and/or alliance/coalition security. In this respect 
intelligence structures have become more dynamic and flexible, adapting quickly to counter both 
direct and indirect risks and threats4”. John Keegan also notes something similar, stating that systems 
do not change unless circumstances change5. 
 
In addition to September 11 being a pivotal tipping point for intelligence organisations and national 
security, the term 9/11 itself has become synonymous with a catastrophic event that occurs almost as a 
 
1 Cambridge University Press. (2019). Intelligence, 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/intelligence 
2 Lynch, A., McGarrity, N., & Williams, G. (19 February 2015) Australia’s Response to 9/11 Was More 
Damaging to Freedom Than Any Other Country’s, The Guardian, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/19/australias-response-to-911-was-more-damaging-to-
freedom-than-any-other-countrys 
3 MacLeod, I. (16 January 2015). Canada’s Post 9/11 Anti-Terror Laws, Ottawa Citizen, 
https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/canadas-post-911-anti-terror-laws 
4 Anton, C. (2015). Intelligence Cycle Planning in Military Coalition Operations, Journal of Defense Resources 
Management, 6(1), pp. 133-136, p. 135 




result of complacency. Terms here such as ‘cyber 9/11’ or ‘cyber Pearl Harbour’ are used to describe 
the threat posed by a cyber attack, where a series of events, such as the mis-interpretation of 
intelligence, failure to recognise the value or importance of intelligence, and the exploitation of 
security flaws and vulnerabilities can lead to devastating consequences – an event which, in hindsight 
should been prevented but all warning signs were ignored or downplayed because it was so unlikely 
to occur. 
 
With regards to September 11, there was intelligence during the 1990’s that indicated a plan to hijack 
civilian aircraft. However, the remoteness of this happening and the focus of intelligence agencies on 
other issues meant that this was not acted upon. This was a similar situation with Pearl Harbour, 
prompting a likely theory that this was intentionally not acted upon to entice the attack, thus allowing 
the United States to enter the Second World War with the support and approval of Congress and the 
American public. 
 
The Intelligence Cycle is a useful formula for the production of intelligence, allowing the State to 
make an informed decision, although care must be taken to prevent the ‘politicisation of intelligence’, 
and the use (or misuse) of intelligence to advance a political agenda. O’Brien refers to the 
‘politicisation of intelligence’ as “the inappropriate use of the intelligence process, intelligence 
collection assets or intelligence-related material for party political purposes … political misuse of 
intelligence taking a variety of forms, occurring at all stages of the intelligence cycle and taking place 
within intelligence agencies6”. It is for this reason that it is essential for intelligence agencies to be 
politically neutral, for their purpose to be solely for the defence of the State.  
 
A prime example of the failure of intelligence can be seen with the case of the former Soviet leader 
Joseph Stalin. Stalin represented “the ultimate nightmare for the intelligence officer: a commander 
who chooses to suppress the very best intelligence handed to him on a plate, because he has his own 
agenda, and is prepared to go to any lengths to prevent the truth becoming known, much less acted 
upon7.” On June 22, 1941, German forces broke their alliance with their Communist allies, crossing 
the border and launching the ill-fated invasion of Soviet Russia. Despite having been presented with 
intelligence showing that Germany was looking eastwards for expansion, Stalin refused to accept this 
as it did not fit his agenda and interfered with his plans. Instead of accepting this and adapting, he 
purged the Soviet military of the majority of its officers – some “seventy-five of the eighty members 
of the Military Soviet … every commander of every military district: two thirds of the divisional 
commanders, half the brigade commanders and over 400 of 456 staff colonels8” were killed due to 
fears of ‘internal enemies’. Stalin knew that military confrontation was inevitable, having been 
presented with irrefutable evidence, but due to him not being ready for it refused to accept any 
intelligence showing him what he did not want to hear, resulting in millions of casualties. 
 
The above case helps to highlight the necessity for intelligence agencies to be politically neutral and 
removed from the politicisation of governments and have independent oversight. Typically, this 
separation is frequent in a more ‘democratic’ nation and much less so in a less ‘democratic’ nation, 
such as an autocracy, where there is little or no division of power. The intelligence cycle is 
particularly useful here in, among other things, determining the value of a potential threat that has 
been identified, with each of the five stages (direction, collection, collation, interpretation, and 






6 O’Brien, C. (2007). Politics of Intelligence: How the Politicisation of the Intelligence Cycle Undermines the 
Integrity of Australia’s Intelligence Agencies, Journal of the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence 
Officers, 15(3), pp. 58-68 
7 Hughes-Wilson, J. (2016). On Intelligence: The History of Espionage and the Secret World, Constable. P. 232. 




The core ideal is that there is a need for an intelligence assessment to be undertaken, something that 
“should be driven by information requirements specifically needed for threat assessment and threat 
management, and the early detection of warning behaviours9”.This could be in the form of a question 
that the State needs addressing, for example. The need for an intelligence assessment should also be 
driven by legitimate necessity for advancing security, and not driven by internal politicking or for 
political reasons, as the case of Australia in 1999-2001 highlights. 
 
Between July 1999 and December 2001 there was a brief increase in the number of arrivals to 
Australia via boat, prompting the ‘Maritime People Smuggling to Australia’ threat to be the highest 
priority for the National Foreign Intelligence Assessment Priorities. Due to the potential for terrorists 
arriving in Australia as asylum seekers, this has prompted the high level of response, despite the 
possibility of this actually being extremely low, with Dennis Richardson, the then-Director General of 
the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Director General, questioning “Why would people 
(associated with international terrorism) use the asylum seeker stream when they know they will be 
subject to mandatory detention?10” 
 
O’Brien furthers this by citing immigration figures showing that eighty-four percent of asylum seeker 
applications in Australia are granted, which would lend credence to the notion here that the threat 
level raised by attempted people smuggling was somewhat over-inflated, intending to “benefit the 
current government’s high profile stand against maritime arrivals rather than the relative nature of the 
threat11”. By raising the threat level in response to this for political gain, such as increased polling 
figures, they ultimately de-valued the threat of other serious issues, such as drugs and arms 
smuggling, potentially undermining efforts underway to curb this threat. Within cyber the 
undermining of the threat posed by hostile foreign actors could ultimately mean the difference 
between a preventing a major cyber attack and allowing it to take place.  
 
To this extent, O’Brien states that “Any political efforts to explicitly interfere with the writing of 
intelligence reports inherently challenges the absolutely fundamental requirement for intelligence 
agencies to be independent from the political process … The principle that intelligence agencies must 
remain free to exercise complete autonomy when determining intelligence assessments underpins the 
integrity of the entire intelligence process12.” 
 
The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade outlines the biggest security threats facing 
the world today as being terrorism, the use of weapons of mass destruction, cyber security, people 
smuggling and trafficking, and space security. Within cyber security, such threats include cyber 
espionage, cyber terrorism, cybercrime, and cyber vandalism (or ‘hacktivism’)13. 
 
One of the main impacts on the direction phase of the intelligence cycle that cyber has had is in the 
nature of the threat assessments requested. With the New Zealand Government Communications 
Security Bureau, one of the biggest impacts in the direction phase can be seen with the intentions of 
the agency. The first publicly published Annual Report, in 2003, addresses the focus of the GCSB as 
being largely focused on intelligence collection through signals interception, ensuring the integrity of 
official information, and “assisting in the protection of the national critical infrastructure from 
 
9 Malone, R. (2015). Protective Intelligence: Applying the Intelligence Cycle Model to Threat Assessment, 
Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 2(1), pp. 53-62, p. 55 
10 O’Brien, C. (2007). Politics of Intelligence: How the Politicisation of the Intelligence Cycle Undermines the 
Integrity of Australia’s Intelligence Agencies, Journal of the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence 
Officers, 15(3), pp. 58-68, p. 62 
11 Ibid, p. 62 
12 Ibid, p. 59 




information-borne threats14”. Through the analysis of the Annual Reports we can see that the nature of 
the requirement for intelligence assessments have changed with the advance and evolution of cyber. 
 
One of the main focuses in 2003 was the ‘War on Terror’, increasing the number of analytic and 
processing staff to address the growing number of trans-national and regional security issues. The 
2003 Annual Report states that the Bureau has two main objectives: to ensure that New Zealand’s 
“interests are protected and advanced through the provision of relevant, timely and accurate foreign 
intelligence, and threat warning intelligence15”, and that official information and critical national 
infrastructure is protected.  
 
The 2011 Annual Report saw a marked difference from the previous reports. Previously the Annual 
Reports showed the GCSB contributing towards increased national and international security, 
prevention of terrorism and major criminal activity, improved Government decision making and 
planning, and economic performance. The 2011 Report, whilst still mentioning improved security and 
economic performance, now also stated a focus on developing cyber capability and maintaining 
support for military operations. Likewise, the 2018 Report shows further changes in direction, 
focusing more on cyber rather than providing support for other operations. For example, in response 
to the increased use of cyber by terrorist and extremist actors internationally, the Report notes that the 
GCSB, in cooperation with other Agencies, is working to reduce and stop the spread of extremist 
propaganda online, noting that “The online proliferation of extremist content and ideologies remains a 
threat to the safety of New Zealanders. Such material is accessible in New Zealand, and is known to 
be read and distributed by New Zealanders16”. 
 




The collection phase refers to the gathering of information relevant for the investigation that has been 
outlined in the direction phase. The various forms of intelligence tend to fall in one of several 
categories: human intelligence (HUMINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence 
(SIGINT), and, more recently, open source intelligence (OSINT). 
 
Human intelligence refers to the use of other people as intelligence sources, through the recruitment 
of agents, etc, and is the oldest method of intelligence collection. Invoking images of historical 
spymasters such as Thomas Cromwell and Francis Walsingham, the field of human intelligence is 
now governed by formal agencies such as the British MI6, the Israeli Mossad, and the New Zealand 
Security Intelligence Service, to name a few. 
 
IMINT, or imagery intelligence, is the use of imagery or video footage. Imagery intelligence provides 
a great deal of visual evidence about a target, such as a potential terrorist training camp, but does not 
provide any context. Imagery intelligence is, in addition to human intelligence, one of the oldest 
means of intelligence collection. Historically this has been through the use of drawings, sketches and 
pictures to assess a target or location of interest. Modern technology now allows for the use of 
accurate photography taken from satellites, infrared imagery, and video footage from drones, to name 
a few. 
 
Signals intelligence, or SIGINT, is intelligence that is obtained from communications. This includes 




14 Government Communications Security Bureau. (2003). Annual Report for the Year Ended 30 June 2003 
15 Ibid 
16 Government Communications Security Bureau. (2018). Annual Report for the Year Ended 30 June 2018 
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Lastly, of the four main intelligence categories is OSINT, or open source intelligence, which refers to 
anything in print or electronic form that is publicly available. This includes newspapers, radio and 
television broadcasts, the Internet, journals, etc. It is in this category that much of the intelligence is 
typically collected, and is not without its potential issues, such as with false information being printed 
with the intention of misleading an adversary.  
 
It is within the collection phase of the intelligence cycle that there has been much discussion in the 
media in recent years, particularly with allegations of mass surveillance and illegal activities by 
intelligence specialists and contractors. It is not just the intelligence that is collected that is of note 
here, but also the way in which the collection was carried out. Cyber has had a huge impact on how 
intelligence is collected, allowing for the taking of extremely high resolution photographs and video 
footage from satellites and drones, the latter of which has proven to be relatively successful, if highly 
controversial, at conducting targeted missile strikes. Additionally, cyber has revolutionised how we 
communicate – no longer through hard-wired telephone lines which can be physically intercepted, but 
now through encrypted SMS messages, video conferencing through digital platforms, forums, and 
cloud-based servers, to name a few.   
 
It is also important to note here that the human element is a significant factor in cyber, where errors of 
judgement, or downright ineptitude, can be a huge boon to intelligence agencies. One example to 
highlight the impact of cyber on the collection phase of the intelligence cycle is in the case of Mark 
Taylor, who became known as the ‘bumbling Jihadi’ for incidentally revealing several prominent ISIS 
locations. Taylor, a New Zealand citizen, moved to Syria in 2014 to join the Islamic State of Iraq and 
the Levant. The following year, using the Twitter handle ‘Kiwi Jihadi’, he had forgotten to turn off 
the geotagging function when posting messages, revealing several Islamic State locations17.  
 
Since its inception in the 2000s, social media has rapidly become a powerful tool for influencing 
people. There were hundreds of thousands of ‘fake’ accounts created on Facebook and Twitter by 
hostile foreign actors during the 2016 US Presidential Election, spreading misinformation about 
Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. Terrorist and extremist groups also have a strong network on 
social media, using this to recruit new followers and sympathisers – and encouraging ‘lone wolf’ style 
attacks in their countries, contributing to the rise of violent attacks by home-grown extremists in the 
United Kingdom, for example. Additionally, the platforms are used for spreading propaganda and 
hate messages and showing video footage of the conflict, such as the infamous beheading scenes. 
Social media here can be both a help and a hindrance to intelligence agencies. On one hand agencies 
are able to see some of the tactics used by these groups in recruit new members and generate 
sympathy, and to see who is following them and discussing this online, enabling them to track 
movements and individuals. On the other hand, while it allows for gathering of intelligence, the 
messages are still being spread. While there have been some attempts by Facebook and Twitter to shut 
down various pages and users when they are notified, it doesn’t prevent it from being posted in the 
first place, and has the very real effect of vulnerable individuals being influenced and indoctrinated. 
Here social engagement also becomes an important concept, where intelligence agencies can actively 
work to not only shut down offensive and hostile content, but can engage with the public in a familiar 
setting, like Twitter or Instagram, to discourage sharing of such content and even refute the messages 
being portrayed.  
 
Collation 
Collation refers to the act of bringing all the intelligence together, sorting through it, and collating it 
into a database that is ready for analysis. This is an important step as it helps to “mitigate natural 
biases that occur when considering more information than can be held in working memory at one 
time. Otherwise, is it easy to fall victim to confirmation bias, the availability heuristic, the 
fundamental attribution error, and other well-known cognitive biases when evaluating complex 
 
17 Hurley, B. (13 October 2019). Police build case against ‘bumbling Jihadi’ Mark Taylor, but outdated anti-




information from disparate sources18.” Within this section alone the use of computers has allowed for 
rapidly recalling enormous databases of information and sharing and accessing this remotely from 
multiple locations. In contrast, for example, in the aftermath of the Second World War, Colonel 
Reinhard Gehlen was recruited by the United States due to him having “collated the best card index 
and records on the Eastern Front … After all, a unique, well collated, accurate and up-to-date 
intelligence database can overcome almost any scruples19”. 
 
Modern technology has had a significant impact on this, with the ability to store huge amounts of data 
on small, portable hard drives, even remote storage accessible via the ‘cloud’. Being able to recall the 
information in an instant, and via almost any networked device has revolutionised the way in which 
databases are managed at every level. This does however have several significant issues. Firstly, there 
are vulnerabilities with storing information digitally. Same as with physical storage, the information is 
vulnerable to being stolen or copied. However, where physical storage requires physically accessing 
to the information, digital storage is vulnerable to being hacked from anywhere in the world, and hard 
drives will eventually fail. 
 
Additionally, there is an issue with having more information than can be processed and used. Again, 
while this is not an issue solely associated with cyber, it is somewhat magnified as a result. For 
example, during the Vietnam War the United States military took aerial photographs every time they 
had a chance, resulting in desk drawers full of pictures that were never once looked at as they were 
quickly outdated and surplus to requirement. Similarly, within cyber there is still a staggering amount 
of information collected that could be considered surplus to requirement. In 2018, for example, the 
New York Times cites a National Security Agency report which stated that the metadata of more than 
534 million phone calls and text messages, utilising American telecommunications providers, had 
been gathered by the NSA. As an aid in the surveillance of someone potentially involved in terrorism 
only a relatively small amount of this data is actually used, the rest being surplus to requirement20. 
 
Cyber has a highly pronounced effect on the collation aspect of the intelligence cycle. It is possible to 
have multiple databases available to recall information instantly, allowing for context to be applied to 
any new incoming information, based on information previously gather and analysed. The 
whistleblowing by Edward Snowden helps to provide a prominent example of the impact that cyber 
has had on the collation phase. John Hughes-Wilson states that the initial founding purpose of the 
American National Security Agency was to focus on foreign communications intelligence. The events 
of September 11, 2001, however, generated a renewed interest in the NSA monitoring potential 
terrorists’ phone and email communications, for which they required the assistance of phone 
companies and Internet service providers. It was the eventual mission creep that led to the Agency 
collecting the metadata of millions of American citizens’ communications.  
 
Interpretation 
Utilising the HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT, and OSINT gathered in the collection phase, the 
interpretation phase of the intelligence cycle is where the analysis is made, drawing a response to the 
reason why there needed to be an intelligence assessment made in the first place21. As was noted in 
the collection phase, care needs to be taken to not be drawn in with false information and misleading 
evidence. In analysing the intelligence gathered, the analyst, where pragmatically possible, utilises 
their sources to corroborate the information – although care must still be taken as it is possible to have 
a human source corroborate intelligence that was broadcast on the radio, for example, but have 
 
18 Malone, R. (2015). Protective Intelligence: Applying the Intelligence Cycle Model to Threat Assessment, 
Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 2(1), pp. 53-62, p. 54. 
19 Hughes-Wilson, J. (2016). On Intelligence: The History of Espionage and the Secret World, Constable. P. 62 
20 In targeting 42 people in 2016, the NSA collected metadata for more than 151 million phone records. 
Savage, C. (2018). N.S.A. Triples Collection of Data from U.S. Phone Companies, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/04/us/politics/nsa-surveillance-2017-annual-report.html 
21 Malone, R. (2015). Protective Intelligence: Applying the Intelligence Cycle Model to Threat Assessment, 
Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 2(1), pp. 53-62 
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everything converging backward upon a single source, such as a newspaper article. Great care must be 
taken in the interpretation phase of the intelligence cycle, with John Hughes Wilson noting “If a 
defeat caused by a catastrophic failure of intelligence … then paradoxically a great victory assisted by 
brilliant intelligence can lead to complacency and an intelligence disaster further down the line22”. 
 
Loch Johnson has identified 8 key attributes for an effective intelligence analysis: accuracy, 
relevance, timeliness, comprehensiveness, readability, probability, objectivity, and actionability. With 
this, for an intelligence report to fulfil its requirement the information contained within it must be 
accurate and relevant, reporting on whether a building is used as shelter for displaced civilians or as a 
safehouse for an arms dealer, for example, and also be current – if the building was a safehouse six 
months ago but has been abandoned then it may not be considered relevant to an arms dealers current 
location. It must also be comprehensive and readable, providing all the information required to make a 
decision, and also engaging to keep the attention of busy policymakers. With probability and 
objectivity, it needs to state the possibility of an anticipated event occurring and is not framed in such 
a way as to achieve a specific outcome – intelligence needs to be impartial. Lastly, intelligence reports 
should be actionable – that is, they should achieve their purpose and allow policymakers to take action 
accordingly. Johnson notes here that ‘Chatter’ about terrorist planning is better than no information at 
all; but precise dates and times … are infinitely more helpful. In 2001, Washington leaders knew 
about the threat of aerial terrorism; what they did not know is that 19 hijackers were going to board 
American commercial airliners on the morning of 9/11, with the objectives of flying the planes into 
the World Trade Centre23.” 
 
Dissemination 
Lastly, the dissemination phase refers to the distribution of the intelligence assessment to those who 
initiated the requirement for it. Within this it is crucial that the intelligence assessment contains 
accurate information and is not designed to sway the opinion of its audience towards a bias. As this 
can have a direct impact on policy and dictate the response of governments, there is a necessity for 
intelligence assessments to be politically neutral and free from a political agenda. Being able to 
receive intelligence in ‘real time’ is, in addition to the accuracy of the intelligence, one of the most 
critical aspects. During the Second World War, the teams at Bletchley Park worked tirelessly in 
cracking German codes, but this was a slow process, where “only about half of all intercepts were 
read, many of them too late to provide practical assistance”24. Following the dissemination phase, the 
cycle returns to the initial direction phase, whereby if the intelligence assessment raises additional 
questions then a follow-up investigation needs to be done and so on. 
 
The dissemination phase can also refer to the sharing of intelligence with allies (or adversaries), and 
may involve the intentional sharing of mis-represented intelligence, to lead the audience to specific 
conclusion (it is for this reason that intelligence domestically should necessarily be free from 
‘politics’). An example of this is during the First World War. During their attempts to stay neutral, the 
United States of America allowed Germany to send diplomatic cables through their diplomatic 
channels. The United Kingdom had cut German telegraphic cables rendering them otherwise 
incapable of communicating with North and South America. The United Kingdom had broken the US 
diplomatic cables and was reading the messages being sent, discovering the German plan to betray the 
American hospitality. Should Mexico ally itself with Germany then a victorious Axis power would 
offer them Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. The issue posed to the United Kingdom here is how to 
inform the neutral Americans without revealing that they were reading their diplomatic cables. 
 
The Admiralty managed to acquire a copy of the message in Mexico City, then show this to the US 
Embassy in London, hinting that they had come about it via a well-placed informant, and leak it to the 
US press. The result was it became a front-page story across all major US newspapers, and the US 
 
22 Hughes-Wilson, J. (2016). On Intelligence: The History of Espionage and the Secret World, Constable. P. 205 
23 Johnson, L. (2011). National Security Intelligence in the United States: A Performance Checklist, Intelligence 
and National Security, 26(5), 607-615, p. 611 
24 Hastings, M. (2015). The Secret War: Spies, Codes and Guerrillas 1939-1945, William Collins. P. 72 
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declaring war on Germany two months later. Had the United States learned at the time that the British 
had broken their cables then it would have been a diplomatic disaster. Similarly, had Germany 
realised that their messages were being read then their means of communication would have been 
changed immediately25. As with modern encryptions, once a system has been broken it can no longer 
be trusted. 
 
One significant impact that cyber has had on the dissemination phase is in the speed with which 
information can be transmitted. Technology has had a great effect on the intelligence cycle, with the 
advent of signals intelligence and imagery intelligence, and through the widespread use of the 
Internet, on open source intelligence also. With thousands of discussion boards, news media websites, 
social media, and video imaging platforms available at a moment’s notice, modern technology and the 
rise of cyber have made it easier than ever to engage socially in a globally connected world. Most 
pressing has been with a global increase in our use of the Internet, this has created multiple digital 
platforms for terrorist organisations and networks to share propaganda images and videos, generating 
sympathy and support around the world.  
 
An underlying theme that does emerge is that no process is perfect, but that by constantly re-
evaluating and adapting to changing technology and demands then the process can at least be better 
than it was. The intelligence cycle, whilst an effective tool for conducting an intelligence assessment, 
is not perfect or infallible, and as has been shown is vulnerable to politicisation and misrepresentation 
of intelligence, resulting in (or even because of) intelligence failures potentially causing significant 
harm. It is for this that increased transparency, as much as could be expected of an agency dependent 
upon secrecy, is essential for its continued success. With such increasingly connected global social 
networks, social engagement with the wider public is essential in keeping the State secure, in 
providing a trusted platform for disseminating  cyber security awareness and improving trust in the 
organisation (which is a key attribute for a democracy). Having discussed the intelligence cycle, this 
thesis now turns to the three national case studies, which will further build upon the key points that 
this section has introduced – social engagement and institutional changes adapting to cyberspace. 
  
 
25 Government Communications Headquarters. (25 January 2019). Real World Impacts: How GCHQ’s 




2. New Zealand Cyber and Intelligence 
In their report Intelligence and Security in a Free Society, Dame Patsy Reddy and Sir Michael Cullen 
note that within New Zealand there is a generally held public idea that as a nation we are relatively 
safe and sheltered from some of the more extreme threats facing our allies elsewhere in the world26. 
Previously any association with the word ‘terrorism’ and ‘New Zealand’ had been used to refer to 
Mark Taylor, or in a more general sense to refer to our counter-terrorism efforts overseas. Media 
reporting had likewise been critical of the idea that a terrorist act could occur in New Zealand. A 
leaked memo from the New Zealand Defence Force in 2016 had warned that a terrorist attack in New 
Zealand was only a matter of time, although this was referring more with regards to Islamic 
extremism targeting Defence Force personnel. In 2019 a terrorist incident in New Zealand did occur, 
targeting the Christchurch Muslim community as they went for afternoon prayers. 
 
On 15 March 2019, Brenton Tarrant opened fire on the Al Noor Mosque and the Linwood Islamic 
Centre in Christchurch, killing 51 people and wounding dozens more. The atrocious terrorist act, 
motivated by extreme Islamophobia and white supremacy, drew international condemnation and 
offerings of support for those affected, in addition to criticism of New Zealand’s Intelligence 
Community (NZIC). In the days following the attack questions began to be asked around why and 
how New Zealand’s domestic agencies had no prior knowledge about his extremist views and how 
could the attack have come about with no indications or warnings. In the immediate aftermath of the 
attack, the core NZIC agencies (the GCBS and the SIS) immediately received an increase in funding 
with the terror threat level being raised to ‘high’ for the first time in national history (although this 
was downgraded to ‘medium’ on 17 April 2019). With regards to the question of why New Zealand’s 
national intelligence agencies were not monitoring Tarrant, threats from white nationalism was not 
something that was being actively monitored as closely as other more pressing threats facing the 
nation, such as people smuggling, for example.  
 
In a similar situation as the 9/11 attacks in New York, Christchurch has shown how devastating a 
single incident can be in causing a global reaction. What long-term implications this has for New 
Zealand’s domestic security strategy remains to be seen. What this event does show, however, is that 
even if a suspect is active on various extremist chatrooms and forums, there is no guarantee that this 
will be noted by an intelligence agency or relayed to their international partners. Whilst the ability to 
operate in cyberspace does have many advantages, particularly with the intelligence cycle and 
allowing for more information to be recalled with quicker turnaround, it is not an infallible process – 
intelligence can be overlooked, misreported and misinterpreted. The following study of intelligence 
reform in New Zealand shows how the community has evolved through making mistakes and 
adapting to operate more efficiently in the digital age and providing advanced cyber capabilities. 
 
Kitteridge Report 
The first major analysis of a New Zealand intelligence agency came from the Review of Compliance 
at the Government Communications Security Bureau27 (otherwise known as the ‘Kitteridge Report’), 
which was conducted by the now-Director of the SIS Rebecca Kitteridge. Commissioned to 
investigate allegations of severe misconduct and illegal spying conducted by the GCSB, the report 
found that while errors had been made, these had come about as a result of misinterpretations of the 
GCSB Act 2003, and not as an act of malice. As a result, one of the key recommendations of the 
report is legislative reform to clarify the legislation and to implement a compliance framework.  
 
Kitteridge also noted that in an organisation such as the GCSB, where they possess such intrusive 
powers and capabilities, there is an essential need for external oversight and accurate interpretations 
of the legislation surrounding these abilities. The report found that the Bureau had no effective 
internal auditing, inadequate oversight, and was misinterpreting the GCSB Act 2003. The 
 
26 Cullen, M. & Reddy, P. (29 February 2016). Intelligence and Security in a Free Society: Report of the First 
Independent Review of Intelligence and Security in New Zealand 
27 Kitteridge, R. (March 2013). Review of Compliance at the Government Communications Security Bureau 
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misinterpretations here were caused by vagueness in the wording of the legislation and of it not being 
fit for purpose. Kitteridge further notes that: 
“Technology is changing enormously … the nature of the communications media being 
intercepted at various stages of GCSB’s existence (high frequency radio, then microwave via 
satellite) meant that communications being targeted for foreign intelligence purposes could 
mostly be readily distinguished and intercepted. That has largely changed with the 
technological switch to ubiquitous use of the Internet. The GCSB Act was intended to be 
technology-neutral and future-proofed, but with the benefit of hindsight it looks to be rather 
narrowly focused on the SIGINT function as it operated in 2003 … it has not kept pace with 
developments, especially in relation to information assurance and cyber security.28” 
 
When the Act was created the technological landscape was drastically different compared with today. 
To highlight how far technology has come since the inception of this Act, the social media site 
MySpace was founded in 2003, the original Xbox gaming console had been released just two years 
prior in 2001, and the dotcom bust of the early 2000s was still very recent. Since this time MySpace 
has risen and fallen, surpassed by several variants and the meteoric rise of Facebook which has 
rapidly become a permanent fixture in many peoples’ lives even in the wake of the revelations of 
immense privacy breaches, such as Cambridge Analytica. Furthermore, the first iPhone was not due to 
be released until 2007, four years after the GCSB Act 2003, and smart phones have come to 
revolutionise how we communicate. We have gone through two additional generations of video game 
consoles, and access to the internet has arguably become essential for life. 
 
The failure of policy to adapt and change as technology has evolved is hardly a situation unique to the 
GCSB, with Lucas Kello noting that “the cyber revolution gives rise to novel threats and opportunities 
requiring immediate policy responses; yet understanding its nature and its consequences for security is 
a slow learning process29”. In addition to the failure of policy and an organisational response to cyber, 
there had been seemingly innocuous decisions at the individual level that contributed to severe 
misunderstandings and implementations of the legislation. Kitteridge notes that GCSB staff had been 
storing compliance advice on their personal drives, meaning that only the individual staff member had 
access to the file, which they were using as an aid to the application of the legislation. This resulted in 
using outdated opinions or advice. The recommendation Kitteridge gave here is that such information 
should be controlled by the legal staff responsible, and continuously updated where required30. 
 
Intelligence and Security in a Free Society 
Following on from the Review of Compliance report was Intelligence and Security in a Free Society, 
by Sir Michael Cullen and Dame Patsy Reddy. Published in 2016, the report advocated strongly for a 
single, cohesive Act that would clearly dictate the functions of the various agencies. Noting that, in 
the aftermath of the report by Rebecca Kitteridge, the GCSB had taken a much more conservative 
stance in their interpretation of the legislation, resulting in the Agency not operating as effectively as 
they could have been, for fear of inadvertently violating the GCSB Act 200331.  
 
The Report was to assess “whether the legislative frameworks of the Agencies  are well placed  to 
protect New Zealand’s current and future national security, while protecting individual rights; whether 
the current oversight arrangements provide sufficient safeguards at an operational, judicial and 
political level to ensure the Agencies act lawfully and maintain public confidence; whether the 
legislative provisions arising from the Countering Foreign Terrorist Fighters legislation, which 
 
28 Ibid, p.24. 
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expires on 31 March 2017, should be extended or modified, and; whether the definition of ‘private 
communication’ in the legislation governing the GCSB is satisfactory32”. 
 
The Report notes that it was immediately apparent that the legislation governing the Agencies was not 
fit for purpose, with a significant lack of clarity in the GCSB Act 2003, meaning that the Agency was 
not able to operate as effectively as it could be. Additionally, the GCSB Act 2003 was not harmonious 
with the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969, resulting in a lack of cooperation 
between the two Agencies33.  
 
They also note that recent international controversies have incited reviews of intelligence gathering 
techniques by other democratic countries, although these “to a greater extent than ours, have been 
conducted against a backdrop of heightened awareness of a very real threat of terrorism … Each 
country has taken a different approach, influenced by the values of its citizens, its political institutions 
and its recent and historical experiences34”.The approaches taken by the United States in the wake of 
events such as 9/11, for example, are drastically different from that taken by the United Kingdom 
following the London bombing in 2005, and again compared with New Zealand following the 
Mosque shooting in March 2019. All three incidents were devastating terrorist attacks which had a 
dramatic impact on the international community but were followed by markedly different responses 
domestically. 
 
Within this there is also a great deal of difference in how the public view the trade-off between 
privacy and security. In discussing this, Cullen and Reddy note that, in 2014, most people surveyed in 
the United Kingdom could support a loss of privacy if it meant a reduction in the threat posed by 
extremists and violent criminals. During the same time period, however, more than 50 percent of New 
Zealanders surveyed found surveillance by Government agencies concerning (although less than 10 
percent could name both of New Zealand’s intelligence and security agencies). Regarding this, Cullen 
and Reddy note that there is a need for the Agencies to be more open about their work and the 
necessity for this to ensure national safety and security35.  To be considered here, however, was that 
during this time period the United Kingdom had experienced a recent terrorist attack, whereas New 
Zealand had not. The first-hand experiences with violent extremism could explain the marked 
differences in the attitudes towards privacy and security in their respective states. 
 
Lastly, one of the main points noted in the report is that the legislation is detrimental in allowing the 
Agencies to adapt to change. With regards to terrorism this can be extremely devastating as terrorist 
organisations will continuously adapt and evolve in response to the organisations tasked with 
combating them. Likewise, cyber is constantly evolving. Unlike terrorism, this is not necessarily as a 
result of illicit intentions, but simply the nature of it – to be constantly striving for newer and better 
technology.  
 
Intelligence and Security Act 2017 
New Zealand’s core intelligence organisations, established during World War II and in the years 
following this, have grown dramatically since their inception. The governing legislation was shown to 
need a serious overhaul with the 2009 review of the New Zealand Intelligence Community by Simon 
Murdoch and the following 2010 Defence White Paper. The Murdoch Report noted that there was a 
need to clarify the role and responsibilities of the agencies in regard to the 2005 Domestic and 
External Security Committee of Cabinet ‘charter’, which set out the integration of the intelligence 
community. Murdoch noted that it “should identify roles and responsibilities of all those stakeholders 
in national security who create or consume intelligence36”. Not having defined roles and 
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responsibilities has proven to be a continuous issue, coming to the forefront very publicly with the 
Kim Dotcom scandal. Murdoch ends the Report stating that there needs to be an examination of how 
to “optimise the effectiveness of our intelligence and security arrangements across the New Zealand 
intelligence community as a whole37”, and how to maximise the efficiency of the agencies.  
 
Echoing the intelligence situation globally, while there had been some efforts at unifying national 
intelligence post-September 11, these efforts were merely attempting to build upon the existing 
intelligence structures and adapt them to the changing world. It was the gradual push showing that 
these structures were not fit for purpose, being better suited to the Cold War period than being utilised 
to counter international terrorism and the fluidity of non-State actors. James Whibley notes that the 
2010 White Paper “realizes the changing overarching security context: economic weight is shifting, 
new technology is materializing that narrows several military aspects where New Zealand’s 
traditional partners previously dominated, and non-state actors are able to pose a threat to the state 
through asymmetric acts38”.  
 
The report also outlines that as the threat of cyber attacks grow, so too does the potential harm that 
could be done due to the increasing reliance on web-based networks. Within this there is the risk that 
if New Zealand does not keep pace with the changes in this area, then “we could become the weak 
link in the shared effort to deter hostile cyber intrusions … the international community seems poised 
on the edge of a new and potentially more unpredictable age of proliferation, accentuated by emerging 
military technologies39”.  Building upon the 2010 Paper, the 2016 Defence White Paper states that 
“The amount of data stored digitally, and the number of devices connected to each other and the 
internet, is rising in both the civilian and military context. This increase, alongside the potential for 
significant disruptions to electronic communication and command and control systems, means 
cyberspace, and the threat to New Zealand civilian and Defence Force networks from cyber attacks, is 
growing in importance40”.  
 
While the Defence White Papers have noted the ever-increasing importance of cyber, and the 
Murdoch Report outlined that there were some ambiguities in the role and functions of agencies, it the 
2013 Kitteridge Report and the subsequent 2016 Report that lead to the Intelligence and Security Act 
of 2017. The Act brought the existing legislation together under a single, cohesive, unifying Act, 
which clarified the Agencies’ objectives and the scope of their activities, and provided provisions for 
how they interact with each other (which was one of the issues of confusion with the existing GCSB 
Act 2003, which did not specify the support that could be provided for other governmental agencies), 
with Section 13 stating implicitly that it is a function of the intelligence and security agencies to co-
operate with each other, and the New Zealand Defence Force and Police. This is one of the pressing 
issues that Lucas Kello had noted about legislation and cyber: it does not keep pace and is showing no 
signs of slowing down. The new Act, whilst it may not necessarily be fit for purpose in 20 years, it 
does resolve and provide clarification around many of the issues that have plagued the intelligence 
community. 
 
New Zealand Security Intelligence Service 
There have been success stories already showcasing how the Intelligence and Security Act 2017 is 
working in fostering an inter-agency environment, whereby the agencies are supporting one another to 
achieve outstanding results. The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet has declassified 
several case studies, one of which is prominent in highlighting how the new Act has been a drastic 
improvement for New Zealand’s Intelligence Community by clarifying the use of telecommunications 
intercepts against New Zealand citizens. 
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The case study details an investigation by the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service investigating 
a potential Islamic State terrorist. A “trusted foreign liaison partner” has informed the SIS that the 
suspect, a man known as ‘Dave’, has been in contact with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and 
has been living amongst them, is attempting to travel to New Zealand at the behest of the group, and 
has a New Zealand mobile phone number. To further assess the risk that this could pose, the 
investigating officer, using ‘Dave’s’ mobile phone number as a reference point, searches NZSIS 
archives, revealing no information; requests information from other governmental agencies, which 
uncover ‘Dave’s’ real identity and that he is due to return to New Zealand in just two days’ time; then 
asks for further information from New Zealand’s international partners, which show that the 
facilitator that ‘Dave’ has been in contact with is an ISIL recruiter. 
 
Further investigation into ‘Dave’s’ closely associated reveals that ‘Dave’ and the facilitator spend a 
considerable amount of time talking on the phone, prompting SIS to apply for a Type 1 Intelligence 
Warrant, to allow the interception of communications of a New Zealand citizen. The warrant is 
approved, and monitoring of their communications reveal that they have booked one-way flights to 
Syria for the following week. Confident that ‘Dave’ is intending to travel to Syria to with the intention 
of joining the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and may ultimately end up engaging in acts of 
terrorism, the decision was made to revoke the targets’ passport to severely inhibit his ability to travel, 
and continue to monitor and investigate his activities. 
 
Not only showing how effective the new governing legislation is in action, the case study here also 
shows the effectiveness of the Intelligence Cycle. The NZSIS had received credible intelligence of a 
potential threat, and directed an investigation into this. During the course of this investigation a 
warrant was used to collect additional evidence, which was then collated to make an assessment. 
Through analysing all the evidence, a report was written which ultimately resulted in action being 
taken and the cycle beginning again with an further monitoring and investigation. 
 
New Zealand Intelligence Community 
The New Zealand Intelligence Community, or NZIC, is primarily composed of three agencies: 
Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), New Zealand Secret Intelligence Service 
(NZSIS), and National Assessments Bureau (NAB). While other governmental organisations such as 
the New Zealand Defence Force, New Zealand Customs Service, New Zealand Police, and 
Immigration New Zealand have intelligence units, the NZIC forms the core of New Zealand 
intelligence.  
 
Tasked with the protection of New Zealand’s national security, international relations and economic 
well-being of the nation, the NZSIS was officially formed in 1969 with the NZSIS Act. While it had 
existed since 1956, it was known as the New Zealand Security Service and it had no governing 
legislation - it was the 1969 Act that defined its role in protecting the State41. 
 
The agency responsible for providing assessments has been known by a variety of names over the 
years, including Joint Intelligence Organisation in 1949, Joint Intelligence Bureau in 1953, External 
Intelligence Bureau in 1975, External Assessments Bureau in 1988, and, since 2010, the National 
Assessments Bureau (NAB). Becoming a civilian organisation and part of the Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) (having previously been a military department), the National 
Assessments Bureau is tasked with providing “analysis on events or developments that are relevant to 
New Zealand’s national security and international relations … [utilising] publicly available 
information such as news media and academic writings, as well as official information such as 
diplomatic reporting and secret intelligence from New Zealand or abroad42”. 
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Government Communications Security Bureau 
The primary functions of the Government Communications Security Bureau are to provide cyber 
threat detection, disruption and protection of information and networks of national significance; 
conduct cyber threat analysis; and collect intelligence, primarily foreign, to allow the New Zealand 
Government to generate informed policy and operational impacts. Since the first publishing of Annual 
Reports in 2003, there has been a gradual evolution in the content published. Beginning with very 
functional reports in 2003, these have gradually evolved to provide more information about the role 
that the GCSB plays, to facilitate an open discussion about the organisation.  
 
The 2003 Annual Report states that the major focus of the GCSB is on the war against terrorism and 
the enhancement of their technical collection and processing capability skills43. Subsequent reports 
state the major focus of the Bureau is on counter terrorism and regional issues in the South Pacific, in 
addition to providing intelligence and information systems security support to the New Zealand 
Defence Force and Ministry of Defence. Of note here is in 2006, where the Centre for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (CCIP) conducted an inaugural national Cyber Exercise, contributing to an 
international effort involving both public and private sectors. In addition, was the establishment of a 
connection with the International Watch and Warn Network, a network of 15 countries operating as a 
collaborative portal for cyber threats44. This marks an interesting turning point in the reporting of the 
Agency, with the increased, publicly known, connections with the wider international community on 
cyber issues and in an attempt at creating a collective defence cyber network.  
 
The National Cyber Security Strategy, first published in June 2011, saw the creation of the National 
Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) within the GCSB. The Strategy states that the “National Cyber 
Security Centre will build on existing cyber security and information assurance capabilities to provide 
enhanced protection of government systems and information against advanced persistent threats45”. 
The NCSC is responsible to dealing with the advanced cyber threats that could potentially harm the 
nations national security or economy. 
 
While 2012 was a difficult year publicly for the GCSB following the controversy arising with Kim 
Dotcom and allegations of illegal spying, the Annual Report notes that there has been the start of 
awareness surrounding the threat posed to New Zealand from cyber attacks and efforts to improve 
public defences here. Additionally, the report notes that:  
“The number of cyber intrusions detected continued to rise over the year and it is clear that, 
unchecked, cyber intrusions are causing significant national security and economic harm to 
New Zealand interests. The operational response led by GCSB is focused on assisting 
designated organisations to build and operate secure IT systems, and to discover, detect and 
mitigate so-called advanced persistent threats46.” 
Similarly, the major focus for the Bureau in 2013 was on ensuring compliance following the Report 
by Rebecca Kitteridge, with 2014 seeing the implementation of the Telecommunications (Interception 
Capability and Security) Act 2013.  
 
One of the biggest responses by the GCSB to the ever-growing threat posed by cyber has been with 
Project CORTEX.  While, out of necessity for operational security, little detailed information about 
CORTEX has been publicly released, this has been a project that the Bureau is extremely proud of. 
Beginning in 2014, and completed in 2017, Project CORTEX was designed to counter advanced 
malware and protect “against theft of intellectual property, loss of customer data, destruction or 
dissemination of private communications, holding data for ransom and damage to IT networks and 
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services47”. Even before being fully complete CORTEX was seeming to prove highly effective, 
preventing, in 2016, an estimated $39.47 million in potential harm.  
 
Additionally, an extremely important part of the GCSB’s response to cyber is in the Bureau’s 
commitment to its international partners and in sharing information for the benefit of increasing and 
improving global security. Through the National Cyber Security Centre, 132 cyber security incidents 
were reported in the first half of 2015 alone, ranging from ransomware to serious attempts to 
compromise information systems of national significance. Through this they were able to trace the 
origins of a new, sophisticated attack to a known threat source and then share the information about 
this with international partners, promoting vigilance about these attacks and reducing vulnerabilities48. 
 
The response by the GCSB to cyber has been not merely adapting their traditional role as a 
communications intelligence agency, but a gradual restructure of the agency with cyber at the 
forefront. The 2019 Annual Report notes that in December 2018 there were 16 National Security 
Intelligence Priorities identified. These outline key security issues for New Zealand and include 
malicious cyber activity and the implications of emerging technology. The latter point here is 
significant with the Report further stating that “Technological acceleration represents a significant 
challenge for the GCSB and as new technologies emerge we must be able to react quickly49”.  
 
New Zealand’s Cyber Security Strategy 
First published in 2011, New Zealand’s Cyber Security Strategy lays out how the government is 
responding to the growing cyber threat, and notes that “The Internet and digital technologies enable 
New Zealanders to have global access to products and services and reduce our geographical isolation 
by connecting us with the rest of the world50”. Such growing connectedness, while helping to promote 
economic growth, also provides a means of inflicting significant harm. With more than 75% of the 
nation having access to the Internet in 2009, and with the ever-increasing sophistication of cyber-
attacks, the implementation of a cyber security strategy has become a necessity.  
 
The 2011 Strategy states that its purpose is to “raise the cyber security awareness and understanding 
of individuals and small businesses; improve the level of cyber security across government; and build 
strategic relationships to improve cyber security for critical national infrastructure and other 
businesses51”. The key priority areas here are awareness, protection, and response. By working with 
organisations such as NetSafe, who provide advice on online safety, the Government can actively 
pursue dialogue with the general populace about staying safe online and cyber vigilance, and helping 
people protect themselves and their children from scams, cyber bullying, sexual exploitation, and 
other cyber issues of increasing prevalence. 
 
The main direct protection and response aspects of the Strategy have been the establishment of the 
National Cyber Security Centre within the GCSB, and with the establishment of CERTNZ. The 
National Cyber Security Centre is a part of the Government Communications Security Bureau, 
providing advanced cyber threat detection and disruption, as well as advice and information on cyber 
security issues. In addition to CORTEX, other projects undertaken by the NCSC include the Malware 
Free Networks initiative in 2018, which “involves the NCSC working with internet service providers 
to deliver ‘active disruption’ of cyber threats52”. 
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In addition to working with New Zealand Police and CERT NZ domestically, the NCSC also works 
with a range of international partners, including the Australian Cyber Security Centre, the National 
Security Agency in the United States of America, the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, and the 
National Cyber Security Centre in the United Kingdom. Established in 2016, CERT NZ, or Computer 
Emergency Response Team, is part of a growing international CERT network, contributing to cyber 
incident reporting, tracking cyber security attacks, and providing advice on how to respond to and 
protect against cyber attacks. Working with several key partners, including the Department of Internal 
Affairs and the National Cyber Security Centre, CERT NZ has five key functions: Threat 
identification; Vulnerability identification services; Incident Reporting Services; Response 
Coordination Services; and Readiness Support Services53.  
 
Comparisons with the 2015 New Zealand Cyber Security Strategy help to show some of the 
effectiveness of the New Zealand Government’s response to the cyber threat. Within this it is noted 
that 90% of households have access to the Internet, and a staggering 83% of people in New Zealand 
having experienced a cyber breach – up from 70% in the 2011 Strategy report. The 2015 Strategy 
intends to make New Zealand “a place where: New Zealanders and their businesses prosper; the harm 
from cyber threats and cybercrime is reduced; fundamental rights online are protected; significant 
national information infrastructures are defended; and New Zealand is respected internationally as a 
secure place to do business and store data54”. This is done through four goals: cyber resilience, cyber 
capability, addressing cybercrime, and international cooperation.  
 
The 2019 New Zealand Cyber Security Strategy notes that within cyber we are rapidly approaching 
the verge of the next major leap, with the upcoming roll-out of the 5G network and the advent of 
quantum computing. In his Ministerial Foreword statement, Minister of Broadcasting, 
Communication and Digital Media Kris Faafoi states that: 
“These new technologies will be disruptive. That will allow us to innovate, but may also 
expose us to greater risk. These technological changes are not happening in a vacuum: the 
geopolitical picture has also shifted, with a greater range of state actors making the most of 
cyber-enabled tools to steal information, spread disinformation and launch attacks. New 
Zealand’s response to the evolving risk needs to be commensurate with our dependence on 
internet connectivity.55” 
This is something that the NCSC is also preparing for, stating in their 2017/18 Cyber Threat Report 
that the 5G networks “will place data closer to the end user, using virtualisation technologies rather 
than having core functions centralised in one location. The spread of these ‘core’ functions across the 
network increases the attack surface56, making it more difficult to protect the confidentiality, 
availability, and integrity of the data traversing the network57”.  
 
Intelligence in New Zealand has grown to not only adapt to advances in cyber capabilities but also in 
how the Agencies will view cyberspace. Cyber has become much more than merely a tool to be used 
to enhance intelligence operations – it has become a platform through which intelligence operations 
can take place. In New Zealand, the approach by the GCSB has gone from using cyber to support 
other operations to focussing on cyber as a platform. As the use of cyber capabilities is growing 
among those with illicit intentions, so too is the response to protect national interests. With the 
increase in hostile campaigns such as phishing, there is an increase in social engagement to provide 
the public with security advice to mitigate the threat posed. 
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3. Innovation and Adaptation to Cyberspace in British Intelligence 
 
British intelligence has evolved considerably over the past hundred years. A revolution borne out of 
necessity, this was facilitated by rapid advances in communications capabilities and the advent of two 
World Wars in relatively quick succession. Modern British signals intelligence began with the 
interception of German radio traffic by the cryptanalysts in Room 40 of the Old Admiralty Building 
during the First World War. In 1914 there was a recognised need in the United Kingdom to protect 
their official communications, but there were no permanent plans to be implemented, just procedures 
in the event of war. Likewise, there was very little in the way of a serious effort to decrypt foreign 
nationals’ communications. To this extent, the first signals intelligence victory that the United 
Kingdom had over the Germans during the First World War “was in fact MO5b (later MI1(b)), an 
intelligence section in the War Office … This was largely due to the fact that the French, who had 
years of Signals Intelligence against the Germans, were prepared to share all that they knew58.” 
 
While Room 40 did not have much early success with foreign signals intelligence, they did contribute 
in an extremely significant way: in the sorting and classifying of the German communications. They 
did not have any success in breaking communications until they received a copy of the Magdeburg 
Code Book, taken from a German Light Cruiser by the Russian Navy. Until this point, their focus on 
classifying intercepted messages laid the foundation for traffic analysis, producing a different type of 
analysis by studying how the German forces communicated59. As was noted earlier in the Intelligence 
Cycle section, collation is one of the main fundamentals of the Intelligence Cycle. Eventually 
becoming the Government Code & Cypher School, before changing into the present-day Government 
Communications Headquarters, the GCHQ provides for signals intelligence in the United Kingdom 
and is one of the core British intelligence agencies. Other core agencies include the Secret Intelligence 
Services, or MI6, which governs foreign intelligence collection; the Security Service, otherwise 
known as MI5, is their domestic counter-intelligence and security service; and Defence Intelligence, 
or DI, which is focussed on gathering and analysing military intelligence. 
 
Government Code & Cypher School 
In the opening introductory paragraph of his book on the Government Communications Headquarters, 
Richard Aldritch states that “’GCHQ’ is the last great British secret. For more than half a century, 
Government Communications Headquarters – the successor to the famous wartime code-breaking 
organisation at Bletchley Park – has been the nation’s largest and yet most elusive intelligence 
service. During all of this period it has commanded more staff than the Security Service (MI5) and the 
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) combined and has enjoyed the lion’s share of Britain’s secret service 
budget60.” This ‘elusive agency’ remained a secret until 1976 when journalist Duncan Campbell 
published information about its intelligence operations overseas.  
 
Established on November 1, 1919, the Government Code & Cypher School (GC&CS) was initially a 
peacetime national signals intelligence and communications organisation within the Admiralty. 
Headed by Alastair Denniston, the GC&CS was responsible for breaking and reading foreign 
diplomatic encryption systems, solely focussing on this. During the post-First World War period there 
was no foreseen need to focus on military intelligence – the advent of a second major war was 
deemed highly unlikely61. It was on 15 August 1939, following Hugh Sinclair’s purchase of Bletchley 
Park, that the War Office relocated GC&CS here, where its intelligence processing and code breaking 
operations expanded greatly. It was here at Bletchley Park that Alan Turing managed to ‘break’ the 
German Enigma cypher system, providing intelligence known as ‘Ultra’. Possession of such high-
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grade intelligence proved to be a boon for the British, but it also posed an issue when it came to 
dissemination, similar to the earlier example helping to draw the United States into the conflict, this 
time it was attempting to warn Soviet Union about the upcoming German betrayal and invasion. 
 
Although the British were breaking the very weak Soviet cyphers, it seemed highly unlikely that 
Hitler would engage in fighting across multiple fronts, and the Soviets were not yet involved in the 
war. Even when they discovered that German units were beginning to mass on the Eastern Front, the 
concept of invasion did not seem plausible, and certainly not a notion that Soviet dictator Joseph 
Stalin would ever entertain. Stalin famously rejected any evidence that did not support his beliefs, 
leading to many intelligence failures in the Soviet Union. Here he believed that any suggestions of 
war were simply the West seeking to provoke war between Germany and the Soviet Union. Indeed, in 
June 1941 Germany did invade the Soviet Union.  
 
Bletchley Park began to pursue a loose intelligence alliance with the Soviets, seeking to trade low-
grade intelligence. Where Bletchley Park was interested in any intercepted communications, the 
Soviets tended to view captured documents as being of supreme importance, to the detriment of all 
else. While the idea of leaving the Soviets and the Germans to fight one another alone filled many in 
the United Kingdom with joy, it was ultimately decided that to support them in defeating the Nazis 
was the better option. The issue at hand then was in how to provide the Soviets with information 
gleaned from Ultra, without letting either side know the true origins of this – the Soviet Union had a 
tendency to use low-level cyphers for highly classified documents, and if the Germans knew that their 
Enigma cyphers were broken then they would use new ones. Many Enigma decrypts had discussed 
the poor cyphers used by the Soviets. The British attempted to warn their ‘allies’, but without being 
able to provide evidence then such warnings were not acted upon62.  
 
The issues here around safeguarding capabilities is not something easily resolved and is especially 
prominent with intelligence sharing agreements. When intelligence is shared and intended to be kept 
secret, the State is relying on another actor for the security of this. A highly prominent example of this 
is with the leaking of information to the media by Edward Snowden in 2013. The debates caused as a 
result of this dominated news media globally for some time and are still making headlines today. 
Within New Zealand it cast a large spotlight on the GCSB about what capabilities they had for 
collecting intelligence, and what our involvement with the Five Eyes network was – a spotlight that an 
intelligence organisation typically tries to stay out of. While whistleblowing and debates around 
capabilities of an organisation are not unique or limited to cyber, the allegations of mass surveillance, 
collection of meta data, and accessing of private communications are within the confines of 
cybersecurity agencies like the GCSB, GCHQ, and NSA. 
 
Government Communications Headquarters 
The Government Code & Cypher School officially became known as the Government 
Communications Headquarters in June 1946, and has grown tremendously since its inception, indeed 
outgrowing the doughnut-shaped building before construction was complete in 2004. Tasked with 
counter-terrorism, cyber security, promoting the United Kingdom’s strategic advantage, combating 
serious and organised crime, and providing support to defence, the GCHQ is the United Kingdom’s 
principle signals intelligence agency. Having undergone several transformations since its inception, it 
was during the 1990’s that the Agency was redeveloped into the modern signals intelligence agency it 
is. Redesigned not just because of the rise of the Internet and developments in modern technology, 
there was the “realization that what was needed was not just a new technical infrastructure, or even 
new organogram, but a radically different type of organization. GCHQ had to be able to cope with the 
fact that virtually all of its targets were now using the same technology, and that techniques developed 
against one target were likely to be of direct relevance to many others63”. 
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In May 2016 the GCHQ announced their presence on social media platform Twitter, signalling a shift 
away from the traditionally secretive and ‘hidden’ world of intelligence. Adopting social media and 
adapting to the way in which cyber is being used, helps the agency to recruit from a new generation, 
and to promote cyber security awareness. Engaging with the general public in a familiar way has also 
helped the agency to regain and strengthen trust and legitimacy, which may have been negatively 
affected amidst accusations of mass surveillance, with former Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott 
tweeting “After years of following us, we can now follow them”64. The increased use of social media 
has proven popular with intelligence agencies internationally and is an interesting way of adapting to 
cyber. Engaging socially helps the agency to create an image of being open and transparent (as much 
as a secret agency can be), and also helps them to achieve one of their main goals of ensuring the 
security of the state by promoting vigilance online in a more effective manner than before.  
 
In additional to adapting to advances in cyber, changes within the organisation have been brought 
about as a result of terrorist incidents, both within the United Kingdom and elsewhere around the 
world. On 7 July 2005, at 8:50 am, four suicide bombers attacked London, three of them targeting the 
underground trains and one, an hour after the initial attack, a bus, killing in total 52 people and 
wounding more than 700. The most devasting international terrorist attack since 9/11, and indeed in 
the United Kingdom the worst incident since the Nazi bombings during the Second World War. 
Following this devastation, there was need for a renewed defence strategy, that was focused on three 
things: “First, they prioritised front line support to the police and security services … Second, it set a 
large team to work on ‘target discovery’, using its databases to try and uncover intelligence on the 
attacks and all those who might be linked to them. Finally, it created a ‘Blue Skies Team’ to try and 
develop new approaches to identify people connected to the bombers65.” 
 
The idea of ‘target discovery’ using databases to identify potential extremists is a rather interesting 
development. After the events of 9/11, agencies had a reinforced emphasis on identifying and tracking 
terrorist and extremist organisations. When news media reported on communications, such as mobile 
phone chatter and emails, use among the extremist organisations dropped off significantly for a time. 
Due to this caution, agencies like the GCHQ used traffic analysis, examining call patterns to identify 
the various groups. Following this was the use of ‘voice prints’, “which allowed them [GCHQ] to 
search volumes of traffic for people who ‘sounded like’ the suspects. The British were apparently the 
first to provide an authentic recording of bin Laden’s voice, which was then used in this way66.” The 
audio recording of his voice was taken from a televised interview on Al Jazeera, and then used to 
search through the vast database of phone calls recorded via satellite.  
 
Additionally, the GCHQ notes another example of how the use of cyber and advanced 
communications tracking technologies enabled them to assist MI5 in identifying a person of interest. 
Within this, an overseas intelligence source informed MI5 that a member of the terrorist organisation 
ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) leadership handed an envelope to an unknown person, 
saying that “(the message contained) information for the brothers in the United Kingdom that will 
cause carnage across London67.” The information that the source was able to pass onto MI5 about this 
was that the person of interest here spoke both English and Arabic, had a generic mobile phone, and a 
high-end tablet. Without additional knowledge, MI5 was unable to pursue this lead further, and 
requested the GCHQ investigate this further. 
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To identify the person of interest here, they began by looking at the ISIL member, who was known to 
them, and monitored his communications activity (in this case phone records) around the date of the 
initial interaction. From this, and with what can be identified and hypothesized about the person of 
interest, they are able to narrow the search, and identify a pattern of calls that fit the pattern 
established for this unknown person -that is, that they had been at a specific location, on a particular 
day and time, and had been in contact with a specified group. With this information helping to narrow 
the search for this person, they are able to track his communications, and note that he has accessed an 
online account revealing his name. The person of interests’ identity, and their recent online history – 
which is still in keeping with the extremist profile initially hypothesized – back to MI5 to resume their 
investigation68. 
 
One aspect that GCHQ Director Jeremy Fleming has noted is that the GCHQ is becoming a cyber 
organisation in addition to their role in intelligence and counterterrorism69. Director Fleming here 
notes that: 
“GCHQ’s role has always been to collect and use intelligence to disrupt, divert and frustrate 
our adversaries. We’ve been doing this since 1919 and we’re very good at it … We have a 
longstanding mission to keep sensitive information and systems secure. This has a 
distinguished history, notably in protecting our own secrets in wartime. But it too often felt 
like the poor relations. Our new mandate, to help make the UK the best place to live and do 
business online, has transformed that perception. This profound development is led within 
GCHQ by the National Cyber Security Centre … 70“ 
Similarly, there have been significant advances in utilising cyber to detect and monitor potential 
terrorists in Israel, with Managing Director of the Israel Security Agency (ISA), Nadav Argaman, 
disclosing in to 2017 that by combining data taken from social media platforms with it’s own 
databases, it was able to identify and detain 400 potential terrorists71. As Israel has experience a sharp 
rise in ‘lone wolf’ terror attacks in recent years, the new tracking system is proving to be a significant 
boon. 
 
National Cyber Security Strategy 
Published in 2016, the National Cyber Security Strategy outlines how the nation is adapting to cyber 
and the issues that are associated with this. One way in which the United Kingdom is responding to 
the increased cyber threat is through their Cyber Essentials programme. The scheme helps 
organisations to protect themselves against low-level threats and “lists five technical controls (access 
control; boundary firewalls and Internet gateways; malware protection; patch management and secure 
configuration) that organisations should have in place72.” With many cyber attacks exploiting basic 
vulnerabilities such as out out-of-date software, the scheme seeks to help prevent future loss through 
poor systems management. 
 
The National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021 also notes that in 2016 “the average cost of breaches 
to large business that had them was £36,500. For small firms the average cost of breaches was £3,100. 
65% of large organisations reported they had suffered an information security breach in the past year, 
and 25% of these experience a breach at least once a month. Nearly seven out of ten attacks involved 
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The Strategy announced plans to transform the United Kingdoms’ cyber security capabilities, 
pledging £1.9 billion towards this. The Strategy notes that “we are critically dependent on the 
Internet. However, it is inherently insecure and there will always be attempts to exploit weaknesses to 
launch cyber attacks. This threat cannot be eliminated completely, but the risk can be greatly reduced 
to a level that allows society to continue to prosper, and benefit from the huge opportunities that 
digital technology brings74.” Seeking to mitigate such risks, the Strategy outlines three main focus 
areas: Defend, Deter, and Develop. 
 
Within the ‘Defend’ focus area, the Strategy notes that should the United Kingdom maintain their 
current approach this will not be sufficient in keeping the nation safe from cyber harm. The persistent 
nature of those who would seek to exploit vulnerabilities or directly attempt to inflict cyber harm 
means that the United Kingdom must inevitably work harder “to defend the UK against evolving 
cyber threats, to respond effectively to incidents, to ensure UK networks, data and systems are 
protected and resilient75.” One way to help achieve this is thorough Active Cyber Defense (ACD), 
which “refers to cyber security analysts developing an understanding of the threats to their networks, 
and then devising and implementing measures to proactively combat, or defend, against those 
threats76.” The network being defended here is United Kingdom cyberspace, and actively defending it 
will ideally help to increase the costs and risks associated with targeting the United Kingdom, reduce 
the amount of incoming malware, secure communications and internet traffic, and further secure the 
nations’ critical infrastructure. Working with communications service providers, GCHQ, and Ministry 
of Defence, success here will be measured by the amount of malware and cyber attacks that have been 
blocked. Without going into detail about how this is happening, the Strategy notes that “the UK is 
harder to ‘phish’, because we have large-scale defences against the use of malicious domains, more 
active anti-phishing protection at scale and it is much harder to use other forms of communication, 
such as ‘vishing’ and SMS spoofing … GCHQ, the Armed Forces’ and NCA capabilities to respond 
to serious state-sponsored and criminal threats have significantly increased77.” 
 
The ‘Deter’ area is focussed on raising the costs of mounting a cyber attack against the United 
Kingdom, and in taking serious action once an attack has been made. The Strategy states that “Our 
adversaries must know that they cannot act with impunity: that we can and will identify them, and that 
we can act against them, using the most appropriate response from amongst the tools at our disposal. 
We will continue to build global alliances and promote the application of international law in 
cyberspace78.” The terrorist event that transpired on September 11, 2001, saw intelligence budgets 
around the world drastically increase as counter-terrorism became a pressing issue. In the United 
Kingdom, the GCHQ had only been monitoring al Qaeda since 2000, picking up increased chatter the 
following year, but had not been entirely focused on this – while the National Security Agency in the 
United States of America had been monitoring them more closely following the bombing of American 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 199879. Counterterrorism has since remained a prominent issue, 
and with the rise in cyber so there has been a slow rise in terrorist use of the Internet and their cyber 
capabilities. The Strategy here notes that, while the technical capabilities of terrorists are limited, they 
will ensure that the threat posed here remains low by committing to detecting and disrupting terrorist 
activities and threats where these arise in cyberspace. A key way in which the United Kingdom will 
deter adversaries is through the National Offensive Cyber Programme (NOCP). The programme, 
developed as a partnership between the Ministry of Defence and the GCHQ, involves “deliberate 
intrusions into opponents’ systems or networks, with the intention of causing damage, disruption or 
destruction80”, and has been designed to both add a deterrent element to hostile cyber actors (where 
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the State likely has considerably more resources to counter-attack), and to also complement offensive 
military action. 
 
Lastly, the ‘Develop’ element looks directly at how the United Kingdom, and through this the 
Government Communications Headquarters, will respond and adapt to the continued advances in 
cyber. The develop aspect requires planning not just for the interim five years (which is the scope of 
the National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021), but planning for the next twenty years, to ensure 
that education providers are able to supply efficient cyber security professionals, that the government 
had certifications and standards in place for this, and that academia will continue to grow within this 
field. One way in which the United Kingdom is seeking to ‘future-proof’ their cyber capabilities is 
through horizon scanning, where they are attempting to anticipate what may affect their cyber 
resilience in five to ten years and building towards this. In doing so they “recognise that horizon 
scanning goes beyond the technical, to include political, economic, legislative, social and 
environmental dimensions81”. 
 
National Cyber Security Centre 
Founded in October 2016, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) is a part of the Government 
Communications Headquarters, focussing on understanding cyber security and responding to 
incidents to reduce the harm caused to interests in the United Kingdom, helping to secure both public 
and private sector networks, and supporting academia and industry providers in building the United 
Kingdoms’ cyber capabilities. The 2019 NCSC Annual Review notes that they have taken a holistic 
approach in providing cyber security for individuals by minimising the threat posed to the majority of 
the population, making it easier to receive cyber security advice, providing tools for the general public 
to protect themselves, and by raising awareness about cyber security82. Noting that in the year ending 
March 2019, there was an estimated 966,000 computer misuse incidents in the United Kingdom, 
involving cyber criminals “sending malicious emails, social engineering (the manipulation of people 
into performing an action or giving away confidential information), water holing (a website infected 
with malware or containing a link to malware) and by making them download malicious software and 
apps83.”  
 
As has been noted before (and was especially apparent during the 2016 US Election Campaign hack), 
it is the human element that proves the weakest link in cyber security and poses a significant issue for 
intelligence organisations. In a nation such as the United Kingdom, where there is extensive use of the 
internet and internet-capable devices, a malicious campaign can pose significant risk to the nations’ 
economic welfare. Indeed, the human element refer to not just the seeming absence of digital literacy 
where people fall victim to malicious cyber scams and crime, but also to the failure of analysts to 
realise the value of intelligence presented to them, or pursue leads where they should have. The 
suicide bombings that took place in London on 7 July 2005 show an example of the failure of 
intelligence here. While those involved in the bombings had been influenced by British Muslim 
websites, they had no direct link to al Qaeda, as initially claimed by British authorities. Indeed the 
perpetrators had been under surveillance by British intelligence in 2003, but their ties to other 
extremists were never fully explored and their networks were never mapped out, which may have 
resulted in the terrorists being arrested before they could carry out their deadly attack84. 
 
In regard to this, the NCSC has noted that they are looking at ways of redefining how cyber security is 
viewed by the general populace, and in how people can be secure without feeling restricted. The 
Report states that:  
“We look at the interaction between people and technology and try to make it easier for 
people to be secure … One of the most important things we’ve seen is the changing mindset 
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between the idea of ‘let’s alter the behaviour of the person or assume they are going to make a 
mistake’ to ‘how can we support developers to make more secure and user-friendly 
products?’ … Instead of forcing security rules on people, we are aiming to make it more 
approachable through clearer language. To do this, we look towards experts in 
communications, marketing and advertising, to refresh the message, always with the aim of 
ensuring the public feel that security is a help, not a hindrance85.” 
In aiding the public to protect themselves online, the NCSC has launched the Cyber Aware campaign, 
which is a part of a set of initiatives involving a wide array of government departments, industry 
leaders, and trusted third party actors. In addition to working with manufacturers to ensure the 
security of software, the NCSC has begun publishing guidelines and small memos. For example, to 
reduce the number of people falling for scams during Black Friday and Cyber Monday, the NCSC, in 
consultation with cyber security experts from Microsoft and the British Retail Consortium, published 
seven tips to help keep people safe. Published on social media, these were ‘shared’ 900 times, ‘liked’ 
2,100 times, and increased the amount of people following the NCSC on Twitter to over 50,000. 
 
Additionally, the NCSC had recently launched the Cyber Defence Ecosystem (CDE), which is 
designed to “Create a structured and automated ecosystem across the UK (and in time globally); Share 
‘our part of the puzzle’ to better defend the UK, partners and allies; Build and enhance threat 
awareness to enable better detection and defence; Rapidly alert enterprise victims of malicious 
activity86”. Designed to complement the Active Cyber Defence programme, the CDE is not just to 
share knowledge, but to create a shared database to allow faster and better response to incidents, and 
to allow organisations to respond to their own incidents thus freeing up valuable resources for use 
elsewhere. 
 
The response here by the NCSC is interesting in that it is both a response to the changing nature of 
societies relationship with cyber and indicative of the changing persona of intelligence organisations. 
Cyber has penetrated almost all aspects of society, with a significant majority of people in developed 
nations being constantly connected to digital media via the Internet. The response here by the NCSC 
has been to embrace and adapt to the meteoric rise of social media by actively asking people to 
monitor them so they can receive updates and information promoting cyber security and staying safe 
online. Additionally, it is indicative of the changes in British intelligence (and elsewhere in the world) 
by actively acknowledging the existence of organisation and their activities (as noted earlier, the 
existence of the GCHQ was considered a national secret), and by encouraging discussion of cyber 
security and what is happening globally, with the increased public cyber attacks by state and non-state 
actors, in an effort to actually promote national security. 
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3. United States of America 
 
Signals intelligence in the United States of America has grown tremendously since the start of the 20th 
century, in both size and scale and in organisational ‘maturity’. During the Second World War signals 
intelligence in the US was extremely fragmented, agencies in competition with one another, and with 
the Army and Navy both having strong signals intelligence and cryptanalytic abilities but operating 
completely independent of each other. It was not until the end of the Second World War that there 
was a push towards inter-agency cooperation and for intelligence to be governed by its own separate 
Agency. It was in 1944 that was there were the beginnings of inter-agency cooperation, with the 
establishment of the Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Coordinating Committee (ANCICC), a 
forum for discussing cryptologic issues. This eventually became the Army-Navy Communication 
Intelligence Board (ANCIB), a civilian agency that was accepted by the Department of State. Here the 
Army agreed to monitor communications from military radio stations and military messages, with the 
Navy handling their counterparts. This left the issue of coverage of diplomatic targets. A viable long-
term solution was not found at this stage, with several efforts attempted such as the Army decrypting 
on odd days of the month and the Navy on even days. This proved decidedly to not be feasible. 
 
It was in June 1942 that an agreement was reached, stating that responsibility for military traffic and 
diplomatic communications lay with the Army, and the Navy was “responsibility for enemy naval 
traffic, enemy naval air and weather systems, and through its wartime control of the Coast Guard, 
surveillance of clandestine communications … The FBI, in addition to sharing the responsibility with 
the Navy for clandestine targets in the Western Hemisphere, worked domestic voice broadcasts and 
domestic criminal actions87”. Burns further states that “The wartime agreements had accomplished 
little more than a basic division of labor and had avoided the real issue of establishing a centralized 
cooperative effort. In the main, the spirit of the earlier measures seemed to reflect an inherent attitude 
that cooperation in COMINT matters was a necessary evil, rather than any real conviction about the 
benefits of centralization or cooperation. Seeking to shelter their vital COMINT functions from 
further budget reductions, the military authorities intensified their efforts to achieve closer 
cooperation and coordination between their COMINT organizations88”. Here, the differing groups – 
the U.S. Army, Navy – can be seen as regarding cooperation as a necessary evil, something that they 
have to work around in order to, at the very least, maintain their current budget, or gain an increase if 
they can attain further control of COMINT functions. 
 
Additional agreements between the military forces soon followed. Whilst throughout the war the 
Army and Navy had maintained separate relations with the United Kingdom, Aldritch notes here that 
“In 1953 the British approached the Americans to suggest a combined organisation for planning 
electronic warfare and radio countermeasures … the two nations managed to get together for a major 
US/UK Electronic Warfare Conference every two years … it was becoming harder to distinguish 
between signals that carried communications and other types of electronic signals89”. Prior to this, the 
United States and the United Kingdom had initiated the discussion culminating in the British-United 
States of America Agreement (BRUSA), which “was predicated in part on the existence of centralized 
controls of COMINT activities within both countries, the approaching ratification and implementation 
of the agreement brought a new, compelling urgency for the United States to put its own house in 
order90”. The BRUSA agreement was a forerunner to the present-day AUSCANNZUKUS Agreement, 
better known as ‘Five Eyes’. 
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Changing priorities in the post-war period led to the focus here being redirected towards the Soviet 
Union, and in turn generated an increased need for a single agency, where “The end of World War II 
signalled the beginning of the end of the exclusive military domination of the Army and Navy 
COMINT organizations. Because of the increased emphasis given to economic, political, and 
diplomatic intelligence, civilian agencies now pressed for a much greater voice in the direction of 
U.S. COMINT activities91”. Furthermore, as the BRUSA Agreement depended upon COMINT being 
centralised, the current fragmented situation within the United States would not be enough to meet the 
demands here. 
 
The United States’ intelligence history, leading up to the creation of the National Security Agency, is 
interesting in how markedly different it is compared to other nations. The NSA was born out of 
necessity, not just to address the growing communications intelligence sector, but because the 
alternative arrangement, having it continue to be segmented among the military with support from 
civilian agencies like the F.B.I, was so inefficient and wrought with internal politicking that there was 
no other option but a complete restructure. After several failed early attempts at creating a centralised 
communications intelligence service, including the establishment of the Armed Forces Security 
Agency (which failed as it did not actually centralise COMINT), and the administering of 
cryptographic functions by the newly created Air Force Security Service. The Army argued for a 
single, unified SIGINT organisation, like that adopted by the British, stressing “the need for 
consolidating into a single armed forces activity all but the most narrowly defined problems of 
primary interest to each service92”. When the SIGINT and COMSEC functions of the Army, Navy, 
and Air Force were combined, the Air Force and, to some extent, the Army found loopholes to avoid 
cooperation and undermine the efforts of others. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 placed a 
renewed pressure on the need for well organised intelligence services, exposing some of the 
limitations of the ‘unified’ effort. With mounting displeasure and frustrations with the timeliness and 
quality of the intelligence output, and critiques by civilian organisations like the C.I.A, the National 
Security Agency was formally introduced on October 24, 1952, by President Harry Truman. 
 
National Security Agency 
Whilst the National Security Agency is not the only organisation in the United States of America 
focused on Signals Intelligence, it is the most prominent and is the equivalent of the New Zealand 
Government Security Communications Service and the United Kingdoms’ Government 
Communications Headquarters. Founded in 1952, the National Security Agency (NSA) has since 
become the largest intelligence organisation in the United States of America. Tasked with signals 
intelligence and cybersecurity, the NSA has noted that the newest and fastest growing threat to 
national and economic security are those developing in cyberspace. While cyberspace and the use of 
the Internet allows the States to grow significantly, as noted earlier it is inherently insecure and comes 
with many vulnerabilities. 
 
Initially tasked with monitoring and analysing traffic on radio waves, the advent of networked 
computing marked a significant turning point in the NSA, and brought about a jurisdictional battle 
with the CIA. Interagency conflict, something not unfamiliar in the United States, and indeed not 
something unique to the State, eventually gave way to the realisation that co-operation tends to yield 
more efficient results. The advancement of cyber and its rapidly expanding use, particularly from the 
early 1990’s onwards, brought about an organisational evolution in the NSA, ensuring their continued 
focus on “activities designed to study and collect how signals and data are communicated and what 
can be divined from those communications … Given that signals analysis and development along 
with other technical intelligence subfields rests on technological trends, there exists a disposition to 
continually be aware of technologies, communication systems, and how these trends impact mission 
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requirements93.” From this, the evolution was natural, with the Agency adapting to remain relevant in 
a world with rapidly advancing and changing means of communication.  
 
One aspect of cyber that has proven to be an issue for the NSA, and other agencies internationally, is 
that they are increasing unable to target individual communication networks. During the Cold War, 
for example, they were able to target individual, isolated communication networks and means of 
communication utilised by Soviet agents. As there has been the widespread advent of public 
communication networks interlinked digitally, it is simply no longer enough to target the individual 
network. A prime example here is with the rise of Al Qaeda, who will utilise these public networks, 
and ‘hide in plain sight’, to organise and relay messages among themselves with a greatly reduced risk 
of detection – targeting communication from an individual agent may yield results, but simply 
targeting the means of communication may no longer be practical94. 
 
In 2013 Edward Snowden made news headlines globally by revealing that he was employed as a 
contractor with the NSA to conduct mass surveillance and that, through the use of sophisticated 
computer software, could wiretap anyone anywhere in the world and monitor everything that they did 
online. All that he needed to do this was their personal email address. These allegations drew 
widespread international condemnation and sparked a number of intelligence and security reviews. 
These allegations also named the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand as being 
complicit through their involvement in the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence sharing involvement.  
 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 1978  
For almost 100 years the United States of America has conducted some form of electronic intelligence 
gathering, aiding in the disruption of subversive foreign actors, the arrest of lawbreakers and 
capturing of terrorists, in addition to providing valuable foreign intelligence. Such abilities and 
powers, however, must by democratic necessity be used only for legitimate purposes and targeting 
those necessary for achieving the required outcome, i.e. not used for nefarious purposes, such as 
spying on a domestic political rival. 
 
It was a Supreme Court decision in 1972 requiring the use of a warrant or judicial sanction for 
intelligence to be collected against U.S. citizens, following the United States’ Senate investigation 
into the gross misuse of power and illegal covert operations domestically by the FBI and CIA that led 
to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) being adopted in 1978. The Act also established 
the FISA Court, which provides “judicial oversight to the gathering of foreign intelligence for national 
security purposes95”. The oversight here is of supreme importance, with Judge Gorton noting further 
that “Before there was a FISA Court, one agency of the Executive could decide when another agency 
of the Executive was entitled to conduct electronic surveillance and physical searches for that 
purpose96”. 
 
Boykin notes that, where the Act allowed for surveillance of foreign powers or their agents, “A 
United States person could not be regarded as a foreign power for purposes of obtaining an order from 
the FISA Court for activities protected by the First Amendment. Nevertheless, a United States person 
could be an agent of a foreign power when the person engages in clandestine intelligence activities on 
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It was after the events of September 11, 2001, that the USA PATRIOT Act (formally known as the 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act) was adopted. Enacted with little opposition, the Act held a number of 
significant provisions, including “Enhanced surveillance procedures for law enforcement, including 
amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Specifically, the Patriot Act gave 
federal officials new surveillance authority in terrorism cases, as well as the ability to conduct 
searches of property without the consent or knowledge of the owner or occupant98”. Furthermore, 
Section 206 of the USA PATRIOT Act enables for the issuing of a roving warrant, where 
investigators can use the single FISA warrant to track a target regardless of whether they change 
communication devices – previously a FISA warrant would be targeting a single device, meaning 
agents would need to obtain a separate warrant for each device used. 
 
The 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) also allowed for FISA warrants 
to be issued against ‘lone wolf’ agents – those who would meet requirements for a FISA warrant 
except for having no explicit ties with a foreign power or terrorist organisation99. This provision 
greatly expanded the scope with which FISA warrants could be issued, such as for non-terrorism 
related cyber crime. While he was on the FISA Court from 2001 to 2008, serving before the recent 
controversies began, Judge Gorton ends his reflections by stating that:  
“The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was designed to (and does, in fact) provide for the 
protection of civil liberties, and the judges of the FISA Court diligently see to it that the statue 
is enforced … I am disturbed by the recent rash of condemnation of the work of the National 
Security Agency and the effort to curtail significantly its surveillance function. The work of 
law enforcement officers involved in our national security that I witnessed, and temporarily 
joined in overseeing, saves lives; and their investigations do not unduly invade the privacy of 
U.S. citizens. The FISA Court plays a vital and necessary role in that regard, a role that 
should be acknowledged and protected by our leaders100.” 
 
 
9/11 and the ‘War on Terror’ 
On September 11, 2001, 19 hijackers took control of four commercial airplanes. American Airlines 
Flight 11, with 92 people on board, was flown the North Tower of the World Trade Centre in New 
York at 8:46 am; United Airlines Flight 175, with 65 people on board, was flown into the South 
Tower of the World Trade Centre at 9:03 am; American Airlines Flight 77, with 64 people on board, 
was flown into the side of the Pentagon at 9:37 am. Lastly, United Airlines Flight 93, with 44 people 
on board in total, crashed into a field near Pennsylvania at 10:03, shortly after passengers had retaken 
control of the aircraft. What has become known as the darkest day in American history, and indeed 
the most devastating terrorist attack to date, killed 2,977 people, and sparked the US-led ‘War on 
Terror’. One major impact that this had is in the revolutions in American intelligence. 
 
Chomik notes that “The security landscape was rapidly changing due to the amorphous nature of 
unconventional non-state threats such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban, along with their increasing ability 
to use technology for nefarious means … The USIC needed methods to become more responsive and 
to transform into a more cohesive unit of cooperating agencies that shared resources, rather than 16 
different silos operating independently of each other101”. It was this, the failure of agencies to 
cooperate with one another and to share intelligence, that was cited as one of the reasons that 9/11 was 
able to happen – agencies had intelligence that this was possible, but no sharing or discussion meant it 
was completely overlooked. 
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As discussed above, the USA PATRIOT Act 2001 was an extremely important response to this, 
providing provisions for increasing and expanding the scope within which surveillance powers can be 
utilised by intelligence agencies. Critically, this removed the provision that agencies are only able to 
conduct surveillance against those considered an ‘agent of a foreign power’, i.e. not a US citizen.  
 
One other important introduction to the US intelligence community was the ‘Intellipedia’, a 
“community-wide, crowd-sourced wiki used to build a database of information that is only accessible 
within the USIC and across secure internal networks102”, allowing analysts from different agencies to 
share information, connect socially, and collaborate in cyberspace. One of the dangers of increased 
inter-agency visibility and sharing is the increased risk of information leaking out and privacy 
breaches, such as was the case with Bradley Manning, who stole hundreds of thousands of documents, 
which were subsequently published on WikiLeaks, leading to “public embarrassment on the part of 
the U.S. government and left questions about the ease of accessibility into otherwise secure networks 
used in the USIC, such as SIPRNet or the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications Systems 
(JWICS)103”. The actions of just one person can have a significant impact on severely damaging the 
trust between agencies, undermine the public faith in the State, and potentially jeopardise ongoing 
operations or even compromise the safety and security of intelligence agents, highlighting the need for 
effective internal oversight and monitoring of compliance.  
 
It is important to note that the response by the US to the terrorist attacks is significant as it did bring 
about greatly increased inter-agency cooperation as they worked towards a unified goal. Further to 
this, the shifting focus for intelligence and the legislative enactments provided significant resources 
for adapting to cyber. The Agencies were able to track a target with a single FISA warrant, were more 
focused on monitoring communications and, where possible, disrupting terrorist communication 
networks and their ability to communicate effectively. 
 
Offensive Capabilities 
In early 2010 centrifuges in Iranian nuclear facilities were able to enrich uranium from 3 percent to 20 
percent, signalling a major step in the ability to manufacturer nuclear weapons (90 percent is 
considered bomb-grade uranium). An alternative to targeted missile strikes against the facilities, a 
computer virus was employed to inhibit Iran’s ability to enrich uranium. Developed by the United 
States and Israel, the virus, known as Stuxnet, exploited several zero-day vulnerabilities in Microsoft 
software to cause the centrifuges to spin increasingly faster and tear themselves apart. Destroying 
almost 1,000 centrifuges and slowing down Iran’s ability to refine uranium, the virus showed the very 
real effect that a well-executed cyber attack can have104. 
 
Of particular note is how the United States, among other nations, are developing offensive cyber 
abilities, and how these weapons differ from conventional means of attack. With conventional 
armaments, having more advanced tools can typically sway the odds in your favour – such as with the 
introduction of automatic rifles and body armour. With cyber, however, the significant factor resulting 
in success or failure is in the skills and abilities of the operatives – the ‘cyber warriors’. It is the skill 
and experience of the cyber warriors, and their ability to react and adapt in real-time, that often 
determines the outcome of a cyber operation. The ability to control the outcome of a cyber operation 
is extremely important as cyberweapons typically tend to become obsolete after their initial use. This 
is because once used it is possible for the opposing party to determine how the attack was able to 
compromise their systems and then fix the vulnerability. In this regard knowledge of vulnerabilities 
and exploits is a particularly valuable commodity for intelligence agencies105. Slayton here cites a 
Defense Science Board task force as stating that most “successful attacks reaching DoD [Department 
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of Defense] networks today result from a personnel failure or out-of-date software in firewalls and 
detection systems. Most of these attacks are understood and preventable through known signature 
management (patching), yet DoD defense systems don’t keep up, and attacks continue to penetrate 
DoD’s networks106”.  
 
Cyber weapons that exploit vulnerabilities in software are also particularly susceptible to 
obsolescence before that may be used. A weapon may be rendered ineffective if the software is 
patched, and the vulnerability no longer exists. As software is generally in a constant state of being 
updated and patched (at least, with good systems administration anyway), there can be time 
constraints imposed on the development of a cyber weapon. One concept driving the offense in the 
US is that of ‘persistent engagement’, the main doctrine being pushed by NSA director and 
Commander of US Cyber Command Army Gen. Paul Nakasone. The aggressive strategy involves 
tracking targets and taking offensive cyber action against them – something that will help further deter 
potential cyber assailant by establishing the US as a dominant cyber actor capable of targeted, direct 
action. Anne Neuberger, head of the newly formed Cybersecurity Directorate, has stated persistent 
engagement is “Knowing that we’re not waiting for the incident, we’re tracking, we’re understanding, 
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5. Issues Posed to Intelligence by Cyber 
 
Taking a somewhat collaborative approach to cyber has not always been the direction undertaken by 
intelligence agencies, and it does not specifically address several key issues posed by cyber. One of 
the main issues is with legislation. Agencies are typically restricted in what they can do because of the 
wording of the relevant legislation, something which is a significant issue with cyber. The nature of 
cyber involves it constantly evolving and improving, seemingly without limitations. Legislation 
enacted in the early 2000’s does not provide provisions for communications intelligence derived from 
social media – social media was not relevant at this point, not beyond forums or message boards. One 
issue that this had posed was in that agencies were unsure what their legal standing was here. Rapid 
advances in cyber tend to create grey areas because there has been no precedent set.  
 
The above three national case studies have shown some of the approaches to cyber that have been 
taken, showing that it is the States’ recent history that has greatly impacted on their intelligence 
reforms – in New Zealand a significant factor was in clarifying the legislation in light of recent 
controversies and allowing them to operate more efficiently in cyberspace. In the United Kingdom we 
have seen tremendous increases in social engagement with the public in response to the rapid rise in 
hostile cyber campaigns. And in the United States of America, the response to 9/11 has seen greatly 
increased funding for their intelligence agencies and amendments to legislation allowing for increased 
surveillance against persons in the State.  
 
Whilst such responses may be a boon to their respective intelligence agencies, they are not without 
their issues. The following section will discuss three of these issues: the Tallinn Manual as an attempt 
to engage with international law and how this may impact intelligence agencies; the right to privacy 
and the approaches to this that have been taken by Australia, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United 
States of America, and Germany; and lastly, the use of cryptography and the ongoing efforts by States 
at undermining the private use of this. 
 
Tallinn Manual 
There have been several attempts at engaging international law about cyber, which has resulted in 
publications such as the Tallinn Manual. While not legally binding, the Manual provides an analysis 
on how existing international law can be applied to cyberspace, noting that “The Tallinn Manual 2.0 
analysis rests on the understanding that the pre-cyber era international law applies to cyber operations, 
both conducted by and directed against states. This means that cyber events do not occur in a legal 
vacuum and states both have rights and bear obligations under international law108.” A key issue with 
this passage, however, is that to take action against a state for hostile cyber activities then they would 
need to prove that it was the state that conducted such hostilities – and not, for example, a non-state 
actor. Tracing the origins of cyber activities can be extremely difficult. The Tallinn Manual takes into 
account several aspects of cyber to construct its discussion, such as where a cyber-attack may cause 
bodily damage, harm to life, or destruction of property, and that it has cross-border elements making 
international law applicable. Additionally, where we can draw distinctions between land, sea, and air, 
and the States’ sovereignty over this, we may also draw such distinctions with cyberspace, and that 
where a computer in one state is used to attack a computer in another state, this may be considered an 
international armed attack, under certain conditions109. 
 
It is important to note that the Tallinn Manual is not to be taken a best-practice guide, but rather an 
examination of how international law could be applied to cyber phenomena. A fitting example of this 
is with sovereignty, where under international law an intentional violation of a States’ sovereignty is a 
wrongful act, this could apply to cyber where “an agent of one State uses a USB flash drive to 
introduce malware into cyber infrastructure in another State, a violation of sovereignty has taken 
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place110”. With the above example, there are critics of this who argue that this should not be seen as a 
violation of sovereignty, and cyber operations should be considered instead international espionage. 
This is not prohibited under international law, and “espionage may violate international law only 
when the modalities employed otherwise constitute a violation of a specific provision of international 
law, such as unlawful intervention or use of force111”. In this regard it is argued further that 
cyberspace should not be considered a sovereign domain, as sea, air and land are. Sovereignty and 
cyber is an interesting discussion as there is no universally accepted notion of what this is. 
 
Furthermore, there is the question of attribution for cyber-attacks. Margulies notes that “The Manual 
relies on the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, which tie state responsibility to showing that a private party is ‘acting 
on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of’ a state112”, reinforced by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia that “held that state officials may be accountable if they 
exercised ‘overall control’ over a group or entity113.” Merely providing financial and technical 
resources would not satisfy this, however114. For a State to be able to retaliate here, the scale of the 
cyber-attack would need to be comparable with a physical, armed attack, to avoid escalating the 
situation further into armed conflict.  
 
A significant issue here for intelligence agencies is to be able to trace the source of the cyber-attack to 
attribute it to a State (or non-State entity), and also determine the effects of the intrusion, which in 
turn may decide any appropriate action to be taken. Margulies further notes that “Cyber is relatively 
easy to direct, given a sophisticated commander, but very difficult to detect … unlike convention 
kinetic action where effects are manifest within a short time after the weapon is used, cyber-weapons 
can take months to detect, lying formant for significant periods or secretly altering data to 
clandestinely compromise a network’s operation115.” 
 
The Tallinn Manual is important moving forward with cyber as it is one of the first major attempts at 
addressing how international law can be utilised in cyber space. While the Manual is not a legal 
handbook or guide for cyber, it is an analysis providing a platform for future discussion and legal 
codification. In this regard it is important for the future of cyber, particularly as hostile cyber actions 
are increasing in number and with non-state actors accounting for a disproportionate amount.  
 
Right to Privacy 
Related to this is the right to privacy, especially with social media. In nations like the United States of 
America, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, etc., there are typically provisions in domestic 
legislation which will outline the rights of citizens and permanent residents to be have freedom of 
movement and expression and a right to privacy. In this regard, arbitrary surveillance of its people is 
forbidden, and should only be done so with a warrant showing that there is a valid cause and reason. 
Programs such as PRISM, which collects metadata indiscriminately, have generate much controversy 
and media attention internationally as they violate these rights, greatly infringing on privacy and 
collecting data of people who would otherwise be free from surveillance. Proponents of such 
programs have advocated the necessity of this, advising that only data directly related to legitimate 
purposes, such as the prevention of terrorism by allowing agencies to quickly map communication 
data, will be accessed – irrelevant data will be destroyed in a given time frame. 
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Eliza Watt notes that “Article 17 ICCPR and Article 8 ECHR apply extraterritorially, which means 
that states must respect the right to privacy whenever individuals are within their territory as well as 
their jurisdiction116”, with the United States stated that they have no obligations toward respecting and 
protecting such rights outside their territories. Debates around the right to privacy, and the wider 
protection of individual human rights, and cyber is ongoing, with further controversial legislation 
being passed by States internationally.  
 
Australia has recently passed the Telecommunications (Assistance and Access) Act 2018, which 
compels companies to provide assistance to government agencies and undermine encryption by 
allowing access to messages and files. The Act has been highly controversial and reminiscent of a 
police state. While Australia already had legislation requiring communications providers to supply 
agencies with a target’s communications where requested, there were concerns that illicit actors were 
utilising the end-to-end encryption offered by communications applications like WhatsApp to deny 
the agencies access. The Bill, which was rushed through Parliament with little opportunity for 
discussion, states that it “equips agencies with the tools they need to effectively operate in the digital 
era … the measures enhance the existing ability of Australian agencies to undertake targeted, 
proportionate and independently oversighted surveillance activities117”. 
 
While the Australian Department of Home Affairs have stated that they are unable to compel an 
industry to break encryption, there are fears that this could require providers to create a ‘back-door’, 
which will allow the agencies access when presented with a warrant. As it is not possible to create 
such access targeting just one person, any move updating the software would affect all users, 
undermining the security of the application and their users’ right to privacy118. Furthermore, in 2018 
Russia banned the use of Telegram, an encrypted messaging application, due to its refusal to 
cooperate with Russian intelligence services. Russian authorities had requested that the messaging 
service allow the State to read the encrypted messages that users domestically were sending and 
receiving119. The request here builds upon the 2016 anti-terrorism law reforms, known as the 
‘Yarovaya law’, which “obliges telephone and internet providers to store records of all 
communications for six months and all metadata for three years, as well as help intelligence agencies 
decode encrypted messaging services120”. 
 
Within the United States and the United Kingdom there have been controversy over the use of cyber 
intelligence programs such as Stingray, which track and monitors mobile phone connections; 
MUSCULAR, which obtains data from internal Yahoo! and Google networks; and TREASUREMAP, 
a highly ambitious programme designed to provide a global map of the Internet, showing in real time 
what is being accessed from any connected device. XKeyscore and PRISM have also gained immense 
media attention since their existence was revealed by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden. 
Developed by the NSA, XKeyscore allows an analyst to search, using only a targets email address, 
“through vast databases containing emails, online chats and browsing histories of millions of 
individuals121”. Der Spiegel also announced in 2013 that XKeyscore was being used by German 
foreign intelligence agency BND, and that they had been working very closely with the NSA in 
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intelligence sharing122. Advanced surveillance technologies like those outlined above gives rise to the 
concept of global surveillance, where surveillance has “developed from a practice carried out 
manually into something now undertaken on a global scale and largely operated by machines123” 
using algorithms to locate individuals who digital footprint may indicate illicit intent. 
 
Much of the discussion regarding the individual right to privacy as competing with the need for 
ensuring State security is centred around the issue of terrorism. In 2013, for example, France’s then-
technical director of the direction générale de la sécurité extérieure (DGSE), stated, in response to 
their collection of telecommunications metadata, “Today, our targets are the networks of the public at 
large, because they are used by terrorists124”.  
 
In Germany, in 2016, it came to light that the Federal Intelligence Service, or BND, was only able to 
monitor 10 messaging services, out of 70 in use, due to end-to-end encryption, something which 
severely impacted upon the data that could be collected. To this end, the “BND requested an extra 
€73m in 2017, to set up project Panos, which would work to find weaknesses in messenger apps to 
circumvent end-to-end encryption … the agency requested additional funding to buy expertise from 
external companies and service providers to help decrypt data and to break devices125.” Surveillance 
by the State is not something that has suddenly been made possible with the advent of cyber – it has 
been happening for thousands of years and is a necessity for the survival of the State. By spying on 
targets (both foreign and domestic) the State is able to, amongst other things, keep apprised of threats 
and take action accordingly. What cyber and the ‘digital revolution’ alter is the scale with which the 
State can spy. Intelligence agencies are now able to monitor and map internet traffic globally, using 
the information to identify potential criminal networks and hostile actors (both foreign and domestic), 
and track malicious cyber actors. The greatly enhanced cyber abilities, however, come with a trade-off 
– the loss of privacy for everyone. Cyber does not discriminate, and the internet is a truly global 
phenomenon, meaning that agencies around the world can, and will, engage in mass surveillance – the 
only real restriction inhibiting a States’ ability to do so is the skill of their cyber operatives. 
 
Cryptography 
As noted previously, encryption was a big issue for Kim Dotcom and Megaupload. Previously there 
had been the so-called ‘Crypto Wars’ involving, notably in the United States of America, attempts by 
government to prevent public use of military grade encryption software, thereby making it easier for 
intelligence agencies to break into civilian encryption domestically. There were efforts during the 
1990’s to inhibit and restrict the development and sale of commercially available encryption, with 
governments fearing that strong encryption would be propagated by those with illicit intent, such as 
paedophiles, the criminal underworld, enemies of the State and foreign agents. If they could ensure 
that weaker encryption was utilised, then it would be easier for government agents, like the NSA, to 
break, and therefore supposedly strengthening national security. In short, these ‘Crypto Wars’ were 
lost, and there has been relatively free development and dispersion of high-end encryption.  
 
Bruce Schneier, a leading cryptographer, cyber security specialist, and fellow at the Berkman Center 
for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, stated that “The government lost the crypto-wars … 
Crypto is now freely available but in a sense they won because there are so many ways at people’s 
data that bypass the cryptography. What we’re learning from the Snowden documents is not that the 
NSA and GCHQ can break cryptography but that they can very often render it irrelevant … They 
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exploit bad implementations, bugs in hardware and software, default keys, weak keys, or they go in 
and break systems and steal data126.”  
 
In 2016 there was a case within the US where James Comey, as then-Director of the FBI, engaged in a 
legal battle with Apple, in a failed attempt to force the company to write firmware to unlock an 
iPhone 5C. Apple’s refusal to cooperate led the FBI to contracting Cellebrite, an Israeli mobile 
forensics company, to bypass the iPhone’s security, at a cost of USD $900,000127. The inability to 
bypass commercial encryption has had a significant impact on law enforcement, with Christopher 
Wray, the successor of James Comey as Director of the FBI, to note that in 2017 alone the Bureau 
was “unable to access data from 7,775128 encrypted devices … despite possessing legal permission to 
obtain the information. The consequences of going dark on these devices has … resulted in major 
setbacks in a number of cases related to counter-terrorism, human trafficking, and organised 
crime129”.  
 
There has also been a very recent case emerge detailing the CIA and West-German intelligence 
secretly owning and running a prominent cryptography corporation providing ‘secure’ devices to 
States and corporations for more than 50 years. Since the end of the Second World War the United 
States and Germany have jointly owned and operated cryptographic devices manufacturer Crypto AG, 
a Swiss-based company who sold devices to more than 120 countries. The highly classified operation 
allowed the United States and Germany to easily read messages sent by Iran, the Vatican, India, and 
Pakistan, to name a few. It has been noted that, from 1970 onwards, “the CIA and its code-breaking 
sibling, the National Security Agency, controlled nearly every aspect of Crypto’s operations … They 
monitored Iran’s mullahs during the 1979 hostage crisis, fed intelligence about Argentina’s military to 
Britain during the Falklands War, tracked the assassination campaigns of South American dictators 
and caught Libyan officials congratulating themselves on the 1986 bombing of a Berlin disco130”. 
Accurately fearing the closeness of the company with the West, Russia and China were never clients 
of Crypto AG, but intelligence operators still learnt a lot about the two States from what other States 
were saying about them. 
 
Additionally, the NSA has been accused by former contractor Edward Snowden of intentionally 
infecting commercial products, granting them remote access. Involving prominent companies like 
“Western Digital Corp., Seagate Technology Plc., Toshiba Corp., IBM, Micron Technology Inc., and 
Samsung Electronics Co Ltd. … since at least 2010 the NSA has routinely received or intercepted 
routers, servers, and other networking equipment being exported from the US to foreign customers … 
The agency, allegedly, obtains the package, implants their backdoor tools, then repackages the devices 
with a factory seal and forwards them to the customer. The infected devices eventually connect back 
to the NSA131.” Very similar to the warnings against using Huawei technology, it seems that the NSA 
may have been doing the very same thing.  
 
Similarly, within the United Kingdom one programme undertaken by the GCHQ is Tempora, which 
taps into the transatlantic fibre cables provided by major telecommunications companies to monitor 
and decrypt internet traffic. The effectiveness of Tempora, however, is mitigated by the increased use 
 
126 Corera, G. (16 March 2014). Who is winning the ‘crypto-war’?, BBC World News, 
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127 Soesanto, S. (2018). No Middle Ground: Moving On From The Crypto Wars, European Council on Foreign 
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of personal encryption technologies employed by the general populace. In this regard, it could be seen 
as being in the interests of the GCHQ to discourage the use of sophisticated encryption technology, 
enabling them continued access to internet traffic flow132.  While it may be argued that allowing the 
GCHQ access to unencrypted internet traffic is necessary for national security purposes, it is 
important to emphasise that their ability to monitor this, that is the lack of widespread use of 




132 Ibid, p. 242 
41 
 
6. The Huawei Scandal 
 
On December 1, 2018, Canadian authorities arrested Meng Wanzhou, Huawei’s chief financial officer 
and daughter of the companies’ founder and CEO Ren Zhengfei, over allegations of theft of trade 
secrets in the United States of America. Reaching this culmination after more than six years of 
growing mistrust and accusations of spying for the Chinese government, the arrest made headlines 
globally. The accusations initially began in December 2001, with Indian intelligence accusing Huawei 
of aiding Taliban forces in Afghanistan by supplying them with communications equipment. Both 
Huawei and China denied such allegations, and without further proof or details of the technology 
supplied, it was thought that the accusations may have been politically motivated as a result of 
China’s close military ties with Pakistan133. The first allegation of intellectual property theft arose in 
January 2003 with Cisco filing a lawsuit against Huawei, claiming that they stole source code, 
documentation, copyrighted materials and other patents134. Huawei admitted that it had used some 
Cisco code, but that this was accidental and that the offending code has since been removed135. The 
lawsuit was then settled out of court in 2004, with provisions for an independent review of Huawei’s 
technology to verify that it no longer contained intellectual property belonging to Cisco136. 
 
Following this was a warning in 2009 by the GCHQ to BT (formerly British Telecom) that 
technology supplied by Huawei could “be hijacked by China to cripple the UK’s communications 
infrastructure137.” Unlike their counterparts in the United States of America, who believed that due to 
the close relationship that Huawei has with the Chinese military their (Huawei’s) systems are 
compromised, the British deemed the risk of this is relatively low, but because of the considerably 
high impact that it would have should it be true then action should be taken. In this instance the 
recommendation that it gave BT was to not use Huawei for the multi-billion-pound network upgrade. 
As the BT network is used by military, intelligence, and governmental departments in the United 
Kingdom, the risk of being compromised, even if the risk is low, is too high to gamble on. 
 
Australia appear to have heeded this advice when, in 2012, they advised Huawei to not submit a 
tender for their National Broadband Network project, citing security concerns. In addition to the news 
not being well received by the Chinese company, former Australian Foreign Minister Alexander 
Downer stated that “the whole concept of Huawei being involved in cyber-warfare is based on the 
company being Chinese (which is) ridiculous138”. It would indeed be unreasonable to claim that 
Huawei should not be trusted imply because they are a Chinese company. However, due to their close 
ties with the Chinese military, theft of intellectual property (whether intentional or not is difficult to 
determine, but this was not an isolated issue), where there is doubt, or even a possibility that Huawei’s 
systems are compromised by the Chinese government, then it would not be unreasonable to take 
mitigating action here. In October 2012, a US congressional panel warned that Huawei posed a 
security threat, and the CIA claimed that the company is spying for the Chinese government – which 
was denied by Huawei in July 2013.  
 
Overtaking Apple as the world’s send-largest manufacturer of smartphones in 2018, Australia and 
New Zealand, in August and November 2018, respectively, announced their decision to exclude the 
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company from the upcoming 5g network139. The Huawei scandal is indicative of a new set of 
challenges laid before intelligence organisations. Companies are increasingly generating and storing 
more and more data about their users, and in the case of a smartphone company this can literally be 
data about its users’ entire life – their financial history, full records of all their communications, travel 
patterns, etc. The allegation that the Chinese government has access to this information, and indeed 








7. How the US Election Hack Shows the Threat to the State 
 
One of the biggest threats to the State comes not from criminals seeking to exploit the naivety of the 
general populace or terrorist and extremists attempting to spread messages of hate and recruit 
vulnerable youths, but from foreign state actors influencing internal affairs and undermining 
democratic processes. Within the United States a prominent example of this, and to further highlight 
the bureaucratic divisiveness of the State, is in the 2016 US Election Hack.  
 
Beginning on 19 March 2016, John Podesta, the then-Chairman of Secretary Hillary Clinton’s 
presidential campaign, received an email stating that due to security concerns he had to change his 
password by following a link in the email. Seemingly innocuous, he followed procedure, nonetheless, 
forwarding the email to his cybersecurity team to verify its authenticity before proceeding. While the 
email was illegitimate, a typo in their response saw him informed that the email was legitimate, 
causing him to use the link in the email to change his password. The email here proved to be a 
successful spearphishing attempt by Russian-based hackers to gain access to DNC systems. The 
information gained from this, which included internal assessments of other Presidential candidates 
including Bernie Sanders and now-US President Donald Trump in addition to private emails, were 
provided to WikiLeaks who subsequently released the documents. While the Republican National 
Committee servers were also hacked, none of the information gained here was released, leading many 
observers to note that the hack here was designed to discredit Secretary Clinton and thereby increase 
the chances of Donald Trump’s campaign. Clinton supports this assertion claiming that Putin has held 
a grudge against her “since 2011 for inciting mass protests against his regime in late 2011 and early 
2012140.” 
 
While the FBI had first noticed security breaches in the Democratic National Committee (DNC) 
servers, the DNC’s IT department disagreed with the risk posed so concerns were not escalated141. It 
is difficult to say here whether escalating or sharing the FBI’s concerns would have made a difference 
as Podesta’s actions were correct in seeking a professional opinion on the email. From this it does 
appear that the hack began because of incompetence by the DNC’s IT department. Again, issues of 
fragmentation here confound the abilities of the United States to take direct action, as the 
responsibility for maintaining and ensuring the integrity of voting systems is under the jurisdiction of 
the individual States. The federal government is left knowing that there are significant issues, but 
powerless to compel the State to act. 
 
A recent report by the RAND Corporation notes that actors utilising hostile social manipulation may 
“employ targeted social media campaigns, sophisticated forgeries, cyberbullying and harassment of 
individuals, distribution of rumours and conspiracy theories, and other tools and approaches to cause 
damage to the target state142 ”. One thing to be taken from the report is in the question of how does an 
intelligence agency respond to the hostile use of ‘soft’ tactics, that is disinformation and social media 
campaigns directed at the general public? It notes that “Moscow has developed an emerging suite of 
tools that give it the potential ability to have significant, perhaps even decisive impacts on electoral 
outcomes143”, which was apparent during the US Presidential Election. While they may be able to take 
some action to remove social media pages publishing ‘fake news’, they are highly limited in what 
they can do without violating the right to freedom of speech and expression, and, as with terrorism, it 
is extremely difficult to remove all the inflammatory content – people are still able to access articles 
spreading disinformation.  
 
 
140 Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (January 6 2017). Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions 
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Where cyber has increasingly become concerned with use by the general public, so has the response 
from intelligence agencies become more focused on their interplay with the public, and in promoting 
a much more cooperative relationship. There has also been evidence emerge showing Russian and 
Venezuelan involvement in influencing the issue of Catalan independence in Spain, and Chinese 
social media has also been sharing such propaganda material. In 2017 alone, of the more than 5 
million messages on social media about this, more than 97 percent came from accounts originating in 
Russia and Venezuela. Through this it has been noted that States traditionally hostile to the West, 
such as Russia, China, Venezuela, Iran, and North Korea, could “work together in creating alternative 
information systems, promoting counter-narratives, and achieving specific disruptive effects144.” 
Blurring the lines even further within cyber between what is real and what is fiction could ultimately 
result in “the deep fragmentation of global information networks, including the internet itself, into 
competing and mutually exclusive zones, with profound effects on world politics and international 
relations. This process is already well underway with the efforts on the part of several countries, most 
notably China, to build what amount to parallel internets145.” Already there have been some early 
attempts at fragmentation of the internet, with the recent internet neutrality discussions. 
 
The 2016 US election hack is particularly interesting as it serves to highlight the difficulties that 
government agencies have in taking action to protect civilian agencies. The FBI had brought the 
intrusions into the DNC servers to the attention of their (the DNC’s) IT team in 2015, but this was not 
followed up on. Similarly, NSA website notes that:  
“Our information networks and technology are constantly at risk from a variety of bad actors 
using a multitude of techniques – remote hacking intrusions, the placement of malware, 
spearphishing and other means of gaining access to networks and information. Some of these 
bad actors are criminals motivated by profit … But cyber threats also come from nation states 
and other actors who seek to exploit information to gain an advantage over the United States 
… Terrorists and extremist groups today use the power of the Internet, especially social 
media, to spread their messages of hate and intolerance, and to recruit new members … The 
global reach of cyberspace and the complexity of its networks provide back actors ample 
places to hide, safe from the reach of international law146.” 
  
 
144 Ibid, p.167 
145 Ibid, p.167 






Intelligence has grown and changed drastically over the last hundred years, from decrypting 
communications during the First and Second World Wars to the masses of aerial photography during 
the Vietnam War, through to modern interconnected technologies. As technology has developed and 
improved over the years, so too has the response by intelligence agencies, adapting to increased risks 
and newer threats. Signals intelligence agencies have undergone an immense transformation, from the 
humble beginnings a hundred years ago, having denied their very existence for decades, to not only 
acknowledging their secret use by Government but encouraging public participation and involvement 
to keep the nation safe – no longer the concept of the ‘Gentleman Spy’. 
 
Rapid developments in technology, allowing individuals, groups, organisations, and States to connect 
and interact digitally has revolutionised the way in which we, as a species, communicate. Our entry 
into the digital era marks a turning point in history, and the implications of cyber are still not yet fully 
known. The legal system is still trying to adapt, and policymakers are struggling to keep up with the 
fluidity of the evolution of this period. Where this new digital era is still largely in its infancy, one 
question it raises is how are intelligence organisations adapting to cyber? We’ve seen the rise of 
‘hacktivism’, and socially disruptive groups like Anonymous; state-sponsored hacking and the 
influencing of electoral campaigns; attempts at fragmenting cyberspace; and mass surveillance over 
an entire population. Cyber is immeasurably immense, essentially forming a new dimension, and 
through the analysis of publicly released annual reports and academic articles we can see how 
intelligence agencies around the world are adapting to cyber.  
 
Governments around the world are increasingly adopting a more interconnected social response to the 
growing cyber threat. The social response is only one part of this, but by engaging with the public this 
can help the Agencies to become more accepted when it comes to otherwise unpleasant issues, such as 
a loss of privacy – either actual or perceived. The response by intelligence agencies around the world 
can be seen as a modern implementation of deterrence policy – ensuring awareness of cybersecurity 
and current security issues, and education about how people can keep themselves and their businesses 
secure, helps to further deny, or greatly reduce the effectiveness of, a cyber-attack. Kello notes further 
here that there is also a self-imposed deterrence, where “the attacker decides not to attack because he 
believes that the negative consequences will affect him as well147”. Simultaneously, retaliation for a 
cyber-attack can be extremely difficult to quantify. One response posed by NATO has been that they 
could respond to cyber-attacks against member states with direct military action. The issue here is 
with proportionality, and in how could you measure the impact of a cyber-attack within a reasonable 
timeframe to justify military intervention? Furthermore, there is also the issue of attribution, in 
determining not only where a cyber-attack has come from, but also in determining if this was 
originating from the State, a state-sponsored actor, or a lone-wolf?  
 
We can use the realist political theory to help explain the response by intelligence agencies to cyber 
globally. Classical realism, as described by Patrick Porter, “begins in pessimism from 
acknowledgement of the reality of power and the enduring insecurity of the world … It sees systemic 
pressures as constraining but indeterminate; recognises the force of ideas and domestic politics in 
driving state behaviour; and treats politics as uncertain, contingent, and subject to the will of 
agents148”. The cyber security and the intelligence community field one fraught with insecurity and 
dubious intelligence, making it, as Porter states, a situation in which governments have no choice but 
to proceed, where the “difficulty lies in the misplaced confidence in one’s own knowledge, the failure 
to scrutinise assumptions being made, and the failure to insure against the unpredictability of one’s 
own actions and their consequences149”. 
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Within the Intelligence Cycle, cyber has had a number of impacts, with one of the main points being 
that the focus of intelligence agencies has typically shifted from using cyber and digital technologies 
as a tool to becoming the focus of several agencies – i.e. investigating and tracking cyber crime and 
cyber terrorism, events happening within cyber. One of the other key adaptations to cyber by 
intelligence agencies has been with changes in public engagement from the agencies to promote and 
enhance the security of the State. No longer staying ‘in the shadows’, agencies are acknowledging 
their existence and reporting on the role they play in ensuring security. Providing a platform for public 
engagement allows them to effectively promote cyber safety and awareness, reducing the 
effectiveness of phishing schemes and online scams, thereby protecting the economic interests and 
security of the State. 
 
In New Zealand two key reports, the Review of Compliance at the Government Communications 
Security Bureau and Intelligence and Security in a Free Society, helped to enact a legislation reform 
resulting in the Intelligence and Security Act 2017. Allowing the Agencies to operate much more 
effectively in the modern era, the GCSB has grown tremendously over the past decade, with the focus 
of the Agency shifting to be responding to cyber rather than utilising it to achieve other objectives.  
Similarly, the United Kingdom has also introduced new legislation modernising their intelligence 
agencies and introduced a Cyber Security Centre. One of the main ways that the United Kingdom has 
adapted to cyber has been, in addition to increased social media campaigns, the use of ‘target 
discovery’, using audio recordings and voice imprints to track targets and rapidly search through 
existing databases. Intense inter-agency conflict plagued the US, greatly fragmenting the intelligence 
community, and something which is slowly being overcome with increased shared databases and 
internal social media. One of the biggest impacts cyber has had in the US has been the legislation 
changes granting agencies additional powers post-9/11. FISA warrants were now able to cover all 
means of communication, rather than for one communication device at a time, and the USAPATRIOT 
Act was introduced, granting sweeping surveillance powers. Furthermore, there has been the 
significant expansion of offensive cyber abilities. Able to act as a means of deterrence also, 
development of offensive cyber abilities in the United States forms a significant part of the doctrine of 
‘persistent engagement’, of tracking and engaging targeting and disrupting their abilities to react. 
 
Such developments in cyber have generated significant controversy, however, as outlined in the 
Tallinn Manual, the right to privacy, and cryptography. The Tallinn Manual represents a significant 
effort to engage international law with cyber. While not legally binding or to be considered a ‘best 
practice guide’, the Manual is an important step in furthering discussion on cyber. With the powers 
that intelligence agencies have and the ease of cyber in surveillance, there has been significant 
discussions on the individuals’ right to privacy. The powers granted to States by legislative reforms 
allowing for increased surveillance measures – both domestic and externally – have proven to be a 
significant boon, allowing authorities to prevent major crime from happening and monitor persons of 
interests in ongoing investigations. The revelations of Edward Snowden and other whistle-blowers, 
revealing the existence and use of mass surveillance technologies by the State have brought about 
renewed discussions of the right to privacy. Whilst surveillance is not something that is new because 
of surveillance, it is the sheer scale upon which it can be conducted that is the cause for concern, 
seemingly reminiscent to that orchestrated by Joseph Stalin. 
 
The view that the public use of high-end encryption poses an issue for intelligence agencies as, while 
they may have the legal authority to access the encrypted information, they lack the ability to do so, is 
valid. However, the issue of whether there should be restrictions on the availability of high-end 
encryption, for the purposes of national security, raises several other highly important issues. Cyber 
does not discriminate, and where insecure, or not-as-secure-as-they-could-be, cyphers are utilised, this 
reduces the users’ ability to be secure from everyone. It is not just agents with he legal authority to 
access the encrypted information that have an increased chance of doing so, it is everyone with the 
technical ability. Through this, cyber has had a tremendous impact on intelligence agencies 
internationally, providing a strong case for legislative changes allowing the Agencies to operate in the 
modern era and also greatly expanding and developing the surveillance powers of the State. The 
legitimate causes for enhancing these intrusive powers have generated significant controversy, 
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sparking debates around the legalities of this and the individuals’ right to privacy, issues which are 






The response by intelligence agencies around the world has been promoting awareness of 
cybersecurity and current security issues, and education about keeping themselves secure, which in 
turn helps to further deny or greatly reduce the effectiveness of a cyber-attack.   
 
Much of the discussion in this thesis has been focused on New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States of America to provide an overview of how Western intelligence agencies are adapting 
to cyber. Other than where they have been discussed in case studies, Russia and China have not been 
assessed in-depth as there is not enough reliable information about their Agencies, and historically 
internal politicking has been quite volatile, making the cases in the United States seem like schoolyard 
squabbles.  
 
Furthermore, whilst these three States, together with Australia and Canada, make up the ‘Five Eyes’ 
intelligence sharing arrangement, it is also important to take into consideration that on top of this the 
States may have multiple arrangements and agreements with other States, such as that between the 
United States and Germany. It was recently revealed that these two States’ intelligence agencies, the 
CIA and West German intelligence, had covertly owned and operated Crypto AG, a Swiss based firm 
that manufactured encryption devices. Unbeknownst to the public, these devices were geared to allow 
access by German and American intelligence forces, enabling them to spy on clients, including the 
Vatican, India and Pakistan, Iran, and military juntas in Latin America. 
 
The cyber awareness campaigns are designed to increase security from the bottom rungs, to help 
prevent people from falling victim to various scams and malicious cyber attacks. Whilst this is 
designed to help prevent significant economic losses to the State, there are also protracted efforts at 
undermining high-end commercial encryption to allow the State to break and access users’ protected 
files. Where this is done under the guise of counter-terrorism, when non-Western states, like Russia 
and China, have adopted these policies they are quickly derided as enacting ‘Big Brother’ laws, before 
pursuing the same thing themselves, such as in Australia.  
 
There was a similar situation again with the United States and West German intelligence covertly 
owning and operating a manufacturer of cryptographic devices, within which they had back door 
access, and then denouncing Huawei for their close ties with the Chinese government. Whilst the 
scepticism about Huawei devices is well-founded, there is a great deal of fear and hypocrisy between 
States internationally.  
 
Moving forward one of the main issues yet to be solved will be around attribution and proportionality 
with cyber attacks. As the Tallinn Manual has identified, it can be very difficult to define what is or is 
not a violation of a States’ sovereignty, and with the rise in state-sponsored cyber crime it can be 
difficult to where a cyber attack may have originated from and by whom. The ICTY set a precedent 
for holding the State accountable for crimes committed by groups that they exercise control over, but 
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